The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) picked Maharashtra Governor and their senior Tamil Nadu leader CP Radhakrishnan (popularly known as CPR) as its candidate for the post of Vice President of India following the sudden resignation of Jagdeep Dhankhar—the first OBC vice president candidate from the state. The election is scheduled for September 9, 2025. The choice of CPR is not merely symbolic; it reflects a calculated move by the BJP on multiple fronts.
Since the 1970s, politics in Tamil Nadu has been dominated by the two Dravidian parties—Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). The intense competition between them left very little space for the BJP to expand. Despite its electoral performance at the national level since the 1990s and being in power at the Union since 2014, the BJP has struggled for political visibility in Tamil Nadu. Only after the demise of Dravidian icons Jayalalithaa (2016) and Karunanidhi (2018) did the party position itself as an alternative to Dravidian dominance.
However, the BJP’s growth has been checked by strong anti-BJP and anti-Hindutva sentiments, more pronounced in Tamil Nadu than in any other state. The DMK’s consecutive electoral successes since 2019 were largely built on its clear opposition to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the BJP. Recognising this, the BJP has, for over a decade, tried to shed its ‘anti-Tamil’ image. Modi frequently invokes Tamil literature, especially the Thirukkural, on national and international stages. He inaugurated the Sengol in the new Parliament, organised events like the ‘Kashi Tamil Sangamam’ and ‘Saurashtra Tamil Sangamam’ in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, and promised grand memorials for Chola kings Rajaraja and Rajendra in Tamil Nadu.
Despite these symbolic gestures, the BJP’s performance in the 2024 Parliamentary elections fell short of expectations.
The party’s aggressive, anti-DMK rhetoric may have won incremental gains, but it also reinforced the DMK’s positioning as the principal bulwark against Hindutva politics. After three consecutive Lok Sabha defeats, the BJP leadership has taken the Tamil Nadu case personally, determined to weaken the DMK, which has played a pivotal role in forging opposition unity at the national level. This has led to the BJP renewing its alliance with the AIADMK despite earlier tensions.
Against this backdrop, the choice of CPR as Vice President assumes strategic importance. A Tamil leader with long-standing BJP credentials, CPR embodies the party’s effort to project itself as more ‘Tamil-friendly’.
The BJP has engaged in similar symbolic calculations in the past, particularly when its political image came under severe strain. In the aftermath of the Gujarat riots of 2002 – where hundreds of Muslims were killed over a month – the NDA government (1999-2004) under Atal Bihari Vajpayee faced an acute crisis of legitimacy. To counter the perception of being an ‘anti-Muslim’ party, the BJP decided to field Dr APJ Abdul Kalam (1931-2015), the celebrated scientist and ‘Missile Man of India’, as its presidential nominee in July 2002.
Kalam’s candidature was strategically significant for several reasons. He hailed from Tamil Nadu, thus allowing the BJP to project itself as inclusive of regional representation in southern India. More crucially, as a Muslim by birth, Kalam’s nomination was positioned as a symbolic gesture of outreach towards the Muslim community. His immense popularity among students and the general public, his association with the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of 1998, and his reputation for simplicity and integrity made him an appealing candidate across party lines.
In subsequent years, the BJP consistently highlighted its role in elevating Kalam, stressing both his identity as a Tamilian and as a Muslim. Narendra Modi’s personal gestures – such as flying to Rameswaram to pay homage at Kalam’s funeral in 2015 and inaugurating a memorial in 2017 – further reinforced this narrative in public memory. The party effectively sought to utilise Kalam’s stature and his minority identity to shield itself against allegations of communal bias.
However, this strategy did not yield the desired political dividends. The Muslim community in Tamil Nadu, as elsewhere, remained deeply sceptical of the BJP, particularly in light of its Hindutva agenda and subsequent policies like the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). Kalam’s popularity did not translate into electoral support for the party, underscoring the limits of symbolic gestures when set against structural political identities and the lived experiences of marginalisation.
The BJP has also sought to consolidate support in Tamil Nadu through targeted caste mobilisation, most notably among the Nadar community in the southern districts. Kanyakumari, where Nadars form a dominant social group, has historically been the BJP’s strongest foothold in the state. In fact, the party’s first-ever elected representative in Tamil Nadu, C Velayutham, won from the Padmanabhapuram constituency in the 1996 Assembly elections—significantly, without the backing of either of the Dravidian parties. Since then, the BJP has consistently enjoyed significant support among the Nadars of Kanyakumari.
However, the BJP’s influence among the Nadars has remained geographically confined to Kanyakumari and has not expanded substantially into other districts where Nadars are present. This reflects the difficulty of translating localised caste-based support into a broader statewide social coalition.
In a similar vein, the BJP’s decision to field CP Radhakrishnan, a Gounder from western Tamil Nadu, as its VP candidate can be read as another attempt to strategically engage with a dominant regional caste group. Just as the party leveraged symbolic representation to consolidate its Nadar base in Kanyakumari, it now appears to be experimenting with the Gounder community, which plays a decisive role in the Kongu belt.
CP Radhakrishnan, a two-time MP from Coimbatore in the 1998 and 1999 elections, hails from the Gounder community, a numerically strong OBC group concentrated in Tamil Nadu’s western districts. His selection also marks a break in social representation. While the state has earlier produced two Vice Presidents—S Radhakrishnan and R Venkataraman—both were from upper-caste backgrounds. CPR represents an OBC segment with strong regional clout.
The rise of CPR in electoral politics is significant. Until the mid-1990s, the BJP had little foothold in Tamil Nadu, struggling to secure votes. For instance, in the 1991 and 1996 Lok Sabha elections, BJP candidates V Narayanan and KS Natarajan polled just 47,267 and 43,289 votes, respectively, in Coimbatore. This trend dramatically shifted in 1998, when CPR contested as part of the BJP-AIADMK alliance.
Riding on the wave of political polarisation after the Coimbatore bomb blasts of 14 February 1998 – an attack aimed at BJP leader LK Advani – the BJP surged.
This sharpened communal polarisation, consolidating Hindu votes in the western districts. The result was a landslide: the AIADMK–BJP alliance won 30 out of 39 Lok Sabha seats in Tamil Nadu, securing 47.52% of the votes. In the western belt, which bore the brunt of the blasts, the alliance swept all nine Parliamentary constituencies. CPR won with a margin of over 1.4 lakh votes—the highest in the state.
The 1999 elections further reinforced this trend. With the DMK allying with the BJP, CPR was re-elected from Coimbatore, while another BJP candidate, Master Mathan, won from Nilgiris. These victories consolidated the BJP’s foothold in western Tamil Nadu, making it the party’s strongest base in the state after Kanyakumari. The Sangh Parivar’s grassroots organisations, especially Hindu Munnani, were already active in Coimbatore. The communal riots of 1997 and the subsequent blasts provided fertile ground for polarisation, enabling the BJP to strengthen its cadre network in the region.
Even after its decline in other parts of Tamil Nadu, the BJP continued to enjoy some influence in the western districts. Of the four BJP MLAs currently in the Assembly, two – Coimbatore South and Modakurichi – hail from this region.
However, caste dynamics added a new layer of complexity. With the elevation of Edappadi K Palaniswami (EPS) from the Gounder community as Chief Minister after Jayalalithaa’s demise, the community’s support shifted back towards the AIADMK.
In the 2021 Assembly elections, the AIADMK-led alliance won 33 out of 46 seats in the western belt, reaffirming EPS’s Gounder base. To counter this drift, the BJP has consistently elevated leaders from the region and community: Vanathi Srinivasan (MLA, Coimbatore South) was made national president of the BJP Mahila Morcha; K Annamalai became the state president; L Murugan was inducted as a Union Minister, and CPR himself was given Governor roles in Jharkhand and Maharashtra before emerging as the party’s Vice Presidential candidate.
Seen together, these appointments reflect a deliberate caste-regional balancing act by the BJP. By projecting OBC leaders from the western belt, the party hopes not only to retain its limited but important stronghold in Tamil Nadu but also to undercut the AIADMK’s Gounder-dominated leadership under EPS. The choice of CPR, therefore, is not just about symbolism at the national level but also a calculated intervention in the local caste–regional equations of Tamil Nadu politics.
Since the announcement of CPR as the BJP’s Vice Presidential nominee, both the BJP leadership and AIADMK chief Edappadi K Palaniswami have repeatedly demanded that the DMK support a “Tamil candidate” and an OBC representative. The BJP’s pitch is clear: frame the election not as a contest over ideology but as a question of Tamil identity.
However, CPR’s record complicates this narrative. A long-time RSS karyakartha, he has been vocal about introducing Hindi as the third language in Tamil Nadu, reflecting the BJP’s recurring campaign that Hindi speakers are “targeted” in the state. This directly clashes with the Dravidian movement’s century-old opposition to Hindi imposition, a core issue historically defining Tamil politics.
For the DMK, which traces its legitimacy to the anti-Hindi agitations of the 1930s and 1960s, supporting CPR would amount to betraying its foundational ideology. In fact, CPR is one of the few BJP leaders who enjoys a cordial personal relationship with the DMK and its chief, MK Stalin. Notably, just before the announcement of his candidature, CPR met Stalin and reportedly enquired about his health. However, politics in Tamil Nadu – especially the DMK’s resistance to the BJP – transcends such personal connections. While personal rapport may exist, the DMK’s political positioning is guided by its ideological commitments and long-standing opposition to the BJP, rather than individual relationships.
Tamil voters, shaped by over a hundred years of Dravidian politics, are adept at distinguishing between symbolic identity politics and substantive issues of social justice, language rights, and state autonomy. For them, being Tamil is not about token representation but about defending a broader cultural and political ethos. Simply nominating a Tamil candidate with RSS affiliations cannot override this deep-rooted political consciousness.
Even though the NDA candidate is almost certain to win, the opposition sees this election as an opportunity to signal that it will resist the BJP’s attempts to dictate terms unilaterally. By standing firm, the DMK and its allies reaffirm their commitment to the principles of Dravidian politics and their resistance to the BJP’s symbolic manoeuvres.
Lastly, the entry of Vijay’s Tamilaga Vetri Kazhagam (TVK) in the 2026 elections could have implications for the BJP’s political strategy, particularly in western Tamil Nadu. As one of the most popular actors in the state, Vijay holds considerable influence among first-time voters and the youth, a segment that often shapes electoral momentum. While his electoral appeal has not yet been tested, it would be unwise to dismiss the potential impact of his popularity.
Given his roots in Coimbatore, Vijay is likely to command significant support in the western region, either by contesting from there or by consolidating a loyal base. Although it remains uncertain whether TVK can translate stardom into sustainable political success, its presence introduces a new variable that could alter voter behaviour and complicate the BJP’s calculations in its emerging stronghold.
Arun Kumar G teaches political science. Views expressed here are the author’s own.