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Kerala’s local body elections results declared on December 13, reveal a political landscape in flux. The United Democratic Front (UDF) won 505 of the 941 grama panchayats and emerged ahead in most municipalities and corporations. The Left Democratic Front (LDF) secured 340 panchayats and held onto some traditional strongholds, while the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) won 26 panchayats, seven more than they secured in 2020.
The NDA, for the first time, also registered a win in one of the six municipal corporations - Thiruvananthapuram - in the state. These outcomes hint at evolving voter expectations and shifting social alignments that call for closer examination.
The LDF, which has exercised sustained influence over Kerala politics since the mid-2000s, has recorded its weakest performance in local bodies in nearly two decades. Veteran journalist and political analyst MG Radhakrishnan places the LDF’s setback within a longer trajectory of political dominance. Since 2006, the Left has remained a central force in Kerala’s politics, alternating in power but retaining organisational and ideological primacy even during periods of opposition. The UDF’s 2011 Assembly victory under Oommen Chandy was narrow, and did not significantly weaken the Left’s institutional strength. Radhakrishnan describes the period since 2006 as one of “nearly two decades of Left dominance”, arguing that “anti-incumbency was the main reason this time” and that this is “the worst performance of the LDF in the last 20 years.”
However, over time, this prolonged presence has generated pressures that have become more visible at the local level. Local body elections, unlike Assembly contests, tend to focus more closely on day-to-day administrative performance. Issues such as waste management, road maintenance, drinking water supply and the pace of civic works figure prominently, particularly in urban and semi-urban wards.
Reports from several districts suggested that dissatisfaction on these issues fed into electoral setbacks for incumbent LDF administrations. In municipalities and corporations, where expectations of service delivery tend to be higher, voters appeared less willing to overlook delays or administrative hurdles, even while recognising the state government’s wider welfare initiatives.
The scale of the LDF’s defeat in areas it once considered impenetrable is particularly telling. The loss of Kollam Corporation, considered a Left pocket borough, to the UDF was far more painful for them than Thiruvananthapuram. In Puthur Grama Panchayat in Palakkad, where the Left had ruled for a quarter-century, they failed to win even a single seat. While the CPI(M) state secretary MV Govindan argues that the front remains dominant in 58 Assembly segments and that no "anti-incumbency wave" exists, the setbacks it received suggests a deeper erosion of support.
The LDF faced a major setback in the Kollam Corporation, where the UDF ended its 25 year reign by winning 27 out of 56 divisions. Reports and post-poll discussions pointed to dissatisfaction among party workers over candidate selection, with complaints that local preferences had been overlooked. This, in turn, affected campaign energy in several wards. Radhakrishnan said “Kollam this time was particularly surprising.”
Similar issues were reported from parts of Alappuzha, where the Left retained pockets of support but saw margins shrink in areas once considered secure. Here, reduced door-to-door campaigning and slower mobilisation were attributed more to internal fatigue than to a sharp swing in voter sentiment.
Journalist Ullekh NP, however, offers a different reading. He suggests that this round of local body elections may have reflected a broader, state-wide political mood rather than being driven primarily by local issues. With the polls held relatively close to the 2026 Assembly election, he argues, voters may have used the exercise to signal their assessment of state-level leadership, rather than to pass judgment on individual candidates or local administrations. Ullekh observes that “this appears to reflect voter dissatisfaction with state-level leadership rather than with individual local candidates, suggesting a broader political mood at play.”
The UDF and NDA campaigns, centred on the alleged misappropriation of gold at the Sabarimala temple, appear to have placed the LDF under significant pressure during the election. The arrest of two CPI(M) leaders, A Padmakumar and N Vasu, both former presidents of Travancore Devaswom Board, had put the party in deeper trouble. The LDF’s efforts to shift the narrative through sexual harassment allegations against Palakkad MLA Rahul Mamkootathil had limited impact, particularly after the UDF expelled him just two days before polling. The anti-LDF campaign gained momentum when a parody song linking the CPI(M) to the Sabarimala gold theft went viral.
The LDF’s electoral strategy has, over successive cycles, relied on the political dividends of welfare delivery. While these programmes retain relevance particularly among economically vulnerable sections their insulating effect appears to have weakened in the context of local governance.
After the results were announced, former CPI(M) minister M M Mani made his frustration evident by accusing voters of ingratitude. He said that those who accepted welfare pensions and ate good food later voted against them. He later retracted the statement following criticism.
Several analysts have noted that welfare benefits are increasingly viewed as entitlements rather than discretionary favours, limiting their ability to offset dissatisfaction with civic administration. In ward-level contests, this has allowed opposition parties to focus attention on hyper-local issues without being overwhelmed by broader ideological narratives.
Another factor contributing to the LDF’s losses has been organisational strain at the grassroots. In a number of districts, the LDF’s losses were compounded by organisational problems at the local level.
In urban pockets of Ernakulam district, disagreements over candidates and campaign strategy appeared to weaken outreach to resident associations and middle-class voters, allowing the UDF and the BJP to gain an edge. Senior Left leaders have since indicated that these local-level concerns will be reviewed. In the Kochi Corporation, the LDF suffered a setback despite the overall goodwill generated by Mayor M Anilkumar. This was in stark contrast to Arya Rajendran’s performance in Thiruvananthapuram, which elicited widespread criticism.
While such challenges are not unique to the Left, they have greater electoral consequences for a party whose strength has historically rested on disciplined cadre networks and strong local committees.
In closely contested wards, even minor organisational lapses proved decisive.
One of the more closely watched trends in this election has been the movement of sections of the Ezhava community, particularly in urban and semi-urban areas. Traditionally a key component of the Left’s social base, Ezhava voters in districts such as Kollam showed signs of drifting away from the LDF.
Radhakrishnan notes that this shift was especially pronounced in Kollam, contributing to unexpected losses in an area long regarded as a Left stronghold. He observes that “middle-class Ezhavas, in particular, have largely shifted away from the Left.” The reasons cited include changing occupational profiles, rising middle-class aspirations and dissatisfaction with local governance. Similar, though less pronounced, patterns were observed in parts of Thiruvananthapuram and central Kerala.
While it would be premature to view this movement as uniform or irreversible, its electoral impact in specific districts suggests that the Left’s social coalition is under strain, particularly among younger and urban voters.
The BJP’s performance in the local body elections marks a departure from its earlier role in Kerala politics. For much of its growth trajectory in the state, the party functioned primarily as a vote-splitter, often weakening the Congress-led UDF and indirectly benefiting the LDF. This dynamic has historical precedent, including periods when the Left itself benefited from the fragmentation of opposition alliances.
The BJP victory in the Thiruvananthapuram Municipal Corporation is significant not only because it represents the party’s first control of a major civic body in Kerala, but also because of the visibility and administrative leverage it provides.
While the BJP’s overall statewide presence remains limited, its performance in parts of Thiruvananthapuram, Thrissur and Ernakulam districts suggests a widening urban footprint. Ullekh notes that “Modi has been in power for over 11 years and there is a national wave in favour of Hindu nationalism. Kerala cannot be an exception for too long. So the trend has affected Kerala too in parts.”
Public policy analyst D Dhanuraj draws attention to the role of leadership and messaging in the BJP’s improved performance, particularly in urban areas. He notes that development has become a more prominent point of discussion in Kerala’s city politics, with sections of the electorate comparing infrastructure initiatives elsewhere in the country with what they see as slower progress at home. He observes that “development has become an important subject of discussion in Kerala. Many people believe that the Modi government has undertaken significant development projects in northern India, and that political differences have prevented Kerala from receiving similar initiatives.”
The BJP has attempted to tap into this perception by emphasising development and administrative efficiency, while keeping overt ideological messaging in the background. Figures such as Rajeev Chandrasekhar have been central to this effort. Viewed by many urban voters as a relatively technocratic and low-key leader, Rajeev has helped the party reach sections of the electorate that have traditionally been cautious about the BJP’s broader political positioning. Dhanuraj adds that “Rajeev Chandrasekhar’s strategy appears to be working. He is perceived as a sophisticated leader and is being accepted in a manner similar to Shashi Tharoor.”
While resistance to the BJP remains, especially among minority communities, this shift in messaging seems to have made the party more acceptable to certain sections of voters.
The BJP’s gains also reflect a degree of voter experimentation typical of local elections. In several wards, support for NDA candidates appeared to be framed in pragmatic terms rather than as ideological endorsement. Voters were willing to test alternatives at the municipal level while retaining different preferences at the Assembly or parliamentary level.
At the same time, the narrative that the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has achieved a significant breakthrough requires a much more skeptical examination. While the capture of the Thiruvananthapuram Municipal Corporation and the Tripunithura municipality combined with a hat-trick win in Palakkad municipality, are historic milestones for the BJP, these urban victories mask a broader stagnation in their electoral growth. In reality, the NDA’s overall vote share has shown no improvement when compared to the 2020 local body polls, remaining stagnant around the 15% mark. Party leaders had claimed that their vote share would touch 25% but the party failed to maintain the surge it enjoyed during the recent Lok Sabha elections. The loss of the Pandalam municipality and heartland panchayats in the Sabarimala region, Mutholi, Kulanada and Cherukol, despite Sabarimala being a talking point shows that in Kerala, electoral supremacy is not a granted thing. The failure to make ground in the Thrissur Corporation—the site of its recent Lok Sabha victory—further suggests that the BJP’s influence is uneven and not sustainable.
This selective voting makes it harder to predict how the BJP’s gains will play out in future elections. While the party has expanded its presence in certain areas, turning these inroads into lasting, statewide support will depend on consistent performance and stronger local organisation.
The UDF’s success went beyond simply benefiting from anti-incumbency against the LDF; it translated voter dissatisfaction into control over panchayats, municipalities, and corporations across the state. That ability to convert discontent into concrete institutional gains helps explain the significance of the election results.
Across gram panchayats, block and district panchayats, municipalities and corporations, the UDF emerged ahead, regaining a presence it had steadily lost over the last decade. In several parts of north and central Kerala, the UDF’s performance suggested more than a fragmented protest vote; it pointed to a relatively unified level of support across key constituencies.
Unlike the BJP, which has been reshaping its political identity in Kerala, the UDF’s comeback relied on familiar strengths: maintaining alliance unity, consolidating its social base, and running an organised campaign. There was little evidence of ideological reinvention or dramatic programme shifts. Instead, the UDF positioned itself as the most credible alternative to the LDF at a moment when dissatisfaction with incumbents was widespread. Ullekh observes that “Pinarayi Vijayan not condemning remarks by SNDP leader Vellappally Natesan, who had made comments about the Muslim community perceived as Islamophobic also pushed the community into consolidating behind the UDF.”
This positioning mattered in a triangular contest. Where opposition votes are split between the UDF and the BJP, the LDF has historically benefited. In this election, however, the UDF succeeded in retaining the bulk of minority support while also drawing a share of floating voters who were dissatisfied with the Left but unconvinced by the BJP.
Muslim voters, in particular, remained largely aligned with the UDF, reinforcing its strength across north Kerala and parts of central Kerala. The Indian Union Muslim League’s organisational efficiency and consistent messaging played a key role in this consolidation. In districts such as Malappuram and Kozhikode, this alignment translated into clear UDF advantages at multiple levels.
Christian voters, especially in central Kerala, also showed signs of returning to the UDF in greater numbers, reversing a period of drift and fragmentation.
One of the UDF’s understated strengths in this election was narrative clarity. Unlike the LDF, which was defending its record, or the BJP, which was attempting to expand into unfamiliar terrain, the UDF was able to frame itself as a corrective rather than a risk.
This mattered particularly in local body elections, where voters often prioritise administrative responsiveness over ideological alignment. In ward-level contests, UDF candidates emphasised accessibility, grievance redressal and local oversight, often contrasting these promises with what they described as administrative fatigue under long-serving LDF councils.
The Congress leadership, despite its internal factional history, largely avoided public infighting during the campaign. This relative discipline allowed district and local leaders to focus on mobilisation rather than internal negotiation, an advantage in a contest where organisational presence matters.
A district-wise reading of the results highlights how varied the drivers of the verdict were.
In north Kerala, the UDF’s gains were largely driven by consolidated minority support and effective coordination within its alliance. Malappuram stayed firmly under UDF control, while in Kozhikode, the LDF retained its corporation but faced narrower margins and lost several surrounding local bodies.
Central Kerala presented a more complex picture. In Ernakulam and Thrissur districts, the UDF benefited from urban dissatisfaction and the fragmentation of the LDF’s traditional support base. Thrissur highlighted the emerging three-way contest: the UDF captured several local bodies, even as the BJP increased its vote share, pointing to a gradual weakening of the Left’s hold in the district.
In south Kerala, the results were more unsettling for the LDF. Kollam district stood out, not only because of losses in traditionally Left-leaning areas but also because of the social shifts underpinning those losses.
The results in Thiruvananthapuram deserve particular attention, both for the BJP’s win in the Municipal Corporation and for the city’s symbolic importance. As Kerala’s administrative capital, Thiruvananthapuram often shapes political narratives and receives outsized media focus.
For the BJP, control of the corporation offers a platform to demonstrate governance capabilities and sustain organisational presence. For the LDF, the loss amplified the perception of setback, even as it retained influence in other parts of the district. For the UDF, the spotlight on the capital could divert attention from its wider gains across the state.
The significance of these results is heightened by the role local bodies play in Kerala’s governance architecture. Decentralisation in the state is substantive, with local governments responsible for planning, implementing and monitoring a wide range of development and welfare activities.
For the UDF, newly acquired control over panchayats and municipalities represents both opportunity and responsibility. Performance at this level will be closely scrutinised, particularly as the Assembly elections approach.
For the LDF, the loss of local institutions has organisational consequences. Cadre-based mobilisation relies heavily on local offices and administrative access. A reduced presence complicates efforts to maintain grassroots engagement and political visibility.
For the BJP, even limited institutional control marks a departure from its historical position in Kerala.
Despite the scale of the UDF’s success, the results do not resolve the Congress’s longer-term dilemmas in Kerala. Leadership at the state level remains unsettled, with questions over succession and strategic direction continuing to linger.
The local body verdict restores organisational confidence but does not guarantee Assembly-level dominance.
For the LDF, the task ahead is renewal organisationally, socially and administratively. For the UDF, the challenge is consolidation without complacency. For the BJP, the priority is governance performance and restraint.
Inputs : Haritha John