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A committee comprising intellectuals and activists that has been consistently campaigning against Special Intensive Revision (SIR) recently held extensive discussions with the Chief Minister of Karnataka, the Deputy Chief Minister, and other cabinet members. The purpose of these discussions was to communicate the committee’s concerns regarding the harmful implications of SIR for Indian democracy and for the citizenship rights of marginalised communities, especially in the wake of West Bengal elections and their results.
The committee submitted a set of demands calling for the suspension of the SIR process in Karnataka. However, the Congress government refrained from making any explicit commitment and reportedly responded by stating that the matter would be discussed internally before any decision was communicated.
To date, the Congress party has not formally opposed SIR in any state. In fact, senior party leader Sashi Tharoor recently claimed that the revision had helped the Congress win in Kerala.
In Karnataka, Chief Minister Siddaramaiah has stated that he does not intend to politicise the issue of SIR, while Deputy Chief Minister DK Shivakumar has publicly called for the successful implementation of SIR and continues to advocate for it. Although certain ministers appear to be engaging with the concerns raised, their approach seems oriented toward making SIR more inclusive rather than opposing the process itself.
However, the states where SIR has been implemented prove the structural and targeted exclusions inherent in the SIR framework. Under the existing procedure established by the Election Commission, individuals are required to establish citizenship by producing one among eleven prescribed documents. For millions of people who lack any of these documents, exclusion is imminent by any modified form of SIR. From this perspective, any attempt to reform or “improve” SIR is suicidal unless SIR is scrapped.
Can the state government intervene?
To assess whether a state government possesses constitutional authority to intervene in the SIR process, it is necessary to examine the legal foundations upon which the Election Commission of India (ECI) has issued the SIR order.
The ECI has invoked Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India, Sections 21, 13(CC), and 32 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, as well as the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, as the legal basis for the SIR exercise. Close examination of these provisions suggests that the constitutional and statutory framework governing electoral roll preparation substantially centralises authority within the Election Commission, leaving no scope for state governments to intervene in national electoral exercises like SIR.
Section 13(CC) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950
Section 13(CC) provides that “Chief Electoral Officers, District Election Officers, and all officials engaged in the preparation, revision, and correction of electoral rolls, as well as in the conduct of elections, are deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission during the period of such employment." During this period, these officers remain under the “control, superintendence and discipline” of the Election Commission.
The implication of this provision is institutionally significant. Although election officials may formally belong to state administrative structures, while discharging electoral functions, they operate under the direct supervisory authority of the ECI rather than under state governments. This creates Constitutional constraints for independent state-level intervention in electoral administration.
Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India
Article 324(1) vests in the Election Commission the “superintendence, direction and control” of the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of the President and Vice-President.
This provision has historically been interpreted as granting the ECI broad constitutional authority over electoral processes in which the state governments play no role. Rather, the constitutional architecture places ultimate supervisory authority with the Central Election Commission.
Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950
Section 21 authorises the preparation and revision of electoral rolls in the prescribed manner and permits revisions under conditions determined by the Election Commission. Electoral rolls attain legal validity only upon final publication in accordance with statutory rules.
From this perspective, the Election Commission possesses extensive powers concerning the revision and maintenance of electoral rolls.
However, SIR exceeds the legitimate scope of electoral roll revision and effectively operates as a form of citizenship verification. Since citizenship determination ordinarily falls within a distinct constitutional and legal domain, the SIR conducted by ECI is unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, unless the Supreme Court of India explicitly adjudicates that SIR is unconstitutional or beyond the Commission’s authority, the operational legitimacy of the exercise remains intact within the existing constitutional framework.
Gram Sabha-based verification and democratic participation
The proposal to read and verify draft electoral rolls in Gram Sabhas may represent a participatory democratic practice aimed at improving transparency and inclusion. However, according to existing Election Commission procedures, such practices are generally associated with ordinary Summary Revisions and Intensive Revisions of electoral rolls. The Election Commission’s 2023 Manual treats Gram Sabha participation as consultative. They are not an autonomous mechanism capable of superseding the Commission’s authority.
Distinguishing SIR from conventional Electoral Roll revision
The ongoing SIR exercise cannot be equated with the ordinary processes of Summary Revision (SR) or Intensive Revision (IR) traditionally associated with electoral roll management. Instead, SIR is presented as a distinct and exceptional procedure for examining citizenship.
Both the Election Commission of India and its Karnataka Chief Electoral Office have issued guidelines that depart from the procedures described in the ECI’s 2023 Manual. One significant procedural departure is the omission of provisions relating to the public reading of draft electoral rolls in Gram Sabhas.
While Parliamentary and Legislative Assembly elections remain under the constitutional authority of the ECI, elections to local self-government institutions are administered by State Election Commissions.
Within this sphere, state governments possess a more substantive consultative role. Consequently, a state government may legitimately advocate for the incorporation of mechanisms such as Gram Sabha verification, public scrutiny, or social audits during the preparation of electoral rolls for local body elections, as the Karnataka State government chooses to conduct local body elections through paper ballots.
Local control over legislative and parliamentary elections is also desirable, and a more decentralised constitutional structure might permit greater state autonomy in electoral administration. Nevertheless, within the existing constitutional framework, such autonomy does not extend to SIR or to electoral processes constitutionally entrusted to the ECI.
Can local body Electoral Rolls counteract the effects of SIR?
Demanding socially audited and error-free electoral rolls for local body elections is not inherently objectionable. Indeed, such exercises may expose inconsistencies, exclusions, or discrepancies generated by the SIR process.
However, these local exercises would have limited institutional effect upon SIR itself. The central reason is conceptual: SIR is interpreted not merely as an electoral roll revision mechanism but as a process implicitly linked to citizenship verification.
Under this logic, individuals excluded during SIR on grounds of inadequate documentary proof may subsequently be treated as ineligible for inclusion even within local body electoral rolls. Thus, discrepancies between local electoral rolls and SIR-generated rolls do not necessarily undermine the internal logic of SIR. Rather, within the SIR framework, such discrepancies may be interpreted as evidence that local rolls contain individuals whose citizenship status has not been satisfactorily established.
The example of Uttar Pradesh illustrates this institutional dynamic. The local body electoral rolls and SIR-based electoral rolls of the UP were prepared simultaneously, resulting in a substantial numerical discrepancy.
There were approximately 15 crore voters in the local body electoral rolls, compared with approximately 12.5 crore voters under SIR.
Yet this discrepancy produced no meaningful institutional challenge to SIR itself. From the standpoint of the SIR framework, the discrepancy was not treated as evidence of exclusionary injustice; rather, the additional names in local electoral rolls could be construed as individuals lacking verified citizenship status.
Mechanisms such as social audits, Gram Sabha scrutiny, or state-level consultative interventions, more desirable and democratic, cannot fundamentally alter the operation of SIR so long as the constitutional validity of the process itself remains intact.
Accordingly, meaningful transformation would require one of two developments:
A judicial determination by the Supreme Court of India declaring SIR unconstitutional or ultra vires, or
Sustained democratic mobilisation capable of generating sufficient political pressure to compel the withdrawal of the policy.
Absent such developments, the present constitutional structure provides no scope for state governments or local democratic mechanisms to substantially reshape or resist the implementation of SIR.
Administrative constraints and the institutional dominance of SIR
Once the SIR process is initiated, the administrative and human resources required for its implementation must necessarily be supplied by state governments. Since election-related personnel are redirected toward SIR operations, the practical capacity of a state government to simultaneously prepare an alternative, comprehensive, and independently verified electoral roll becomes severely constrained.
Even if a state government were to undertake such an exercise — for example, through social audits or participatory verification mechanisms — the resulting electoral roll would remain vulnerable within the internal logic of SIR itself. If SIR is interpreted as a process linked to citizenship verification, then individuals excluded from the SIR framework may subsequently be categorised as persons whose citizenship status remains ‘unverified’. Consequently, any alternative electoral roll containing such individuals could be characterised within the SIR framework as defective or illegitimate.
The broader implication is that the institutional power of SIR derives not merely from administrative centralisation, but also from the normative association it establishes between citizenship verification and electoral legitimacy. Under such conditions, parallel state-level electoral exercises possess limited capacity to counteract the authority of SIR.
Another important point is the reliability of assurances given by the Congress Government.
The Congress government entered into discussions concerning SIR primarily because of sustained pressure exerted by social movements and civil society organisations, rather than due to any principled institutional opposition to SIR itself.
Hence, although certain ministers may appear sympathetic to the concerns raised by activists, the Congress party as an organisation has demonstrated little willingness – either in Karnataka or elsewhere in India – to openly challenge the unconstitutional character of the SIR process.
Two principal political explanations could be offered for this reluctance:
Concern that opposition to SIR could invite right-wing accusations of supporting ‘illegal Muslim infiltrators’
Electoral anxieties regarding the potential loss of Hindu votes. Chronic malaise called “soft Hindutva”.
A long list of commitments made by the Congress government while seeking the support of secular social movements was subsequently diluted, delayed, or betrayed. It is important to take a hard look at this track record of Congress governments before considering their overtures to the anti-SIR movement.
Unless accompanied by concrete institutional or legislative action, the Congress' assurances regarding SIR should be treated cautiously. Within this framework, dialogue with activists is not necessarily evidence of substantive opposition to SIR, but rather could be another example of a recurring political pattern in which consultation with social movements does not translate into structural intervention.
The complete withdrawal of SIR should constitute the sole and central demand around which democratic mobilisation should be organised. Drawing upon both historical experience and contemporary political developments, activists and social movements must move beyond the belief that the Congress party can be fundamentally persuaded to alter its position through dialogue alone.
Still, as the electorate and citizens, one should demand that the elected state government:
Appeal before the Supreme Court: The state government should be pressured to formally approach the Supreme Court and present before it the alleged constitutional deficiencies, exclusionary consequences, and democratic implications of the SIR process. Provide examples from the West Bengal elections.
Request suspension pending constitutional adjudication: The government should request that the Supreme Court direct the Election Commission not to implement SIR in Karnataka until a final judicial determination regarding the constitutionality of the exercise is delivered.
Hence, the consolidation of anti-SIR mobilisation around a single, unified political demand: the complete withdrawal of the SIR is the need of the hour.
Accordingly, dispersing organisational resources across multiple procedural or reform-orientated demands weakens the political clarity and strategic coherence of the movement. In contrast, a unified demand for scrapping SIR is capable of producing broader democratic mobilisation and clearer constitutional confrontation.
That is the only effective political pathway available under the current conditions.
Shivasundar is an activist and freelance journalist. Views expressed are the author’s own.
