Tamil Nadu is often hailed as a bastion of anti-Hindutva politics in India. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) has projected itself as a national bulwark against Hindutva ideology.
The DMK-led alliance in Tamil Nadu presents itself as a principled front that opposes Hindutva forces and ensures social and economic justice rather than a purely electoral arrangement. This claim is complicated by the DMK government’s neglect of Dalit rights and the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, which have raised concerns within the alliance.
However, the Left parties and the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) have appeared more cautious and less confrontational ever since the DMK came to power in 2021.
Historically, Tamil Nadu has maintained a culture of intra-alliance dissent. Friction between ruling parties and ideological allies shaped welfare, labour rights, and social justice policies in the state. Tamil Nadu’s progress often came not through regime change alone but through debates and disagreements.
Now, despite the Left and the VCK’s ideological roots in social justice and economic equality, they appear hesitant to question the DMK government on its failures. There is a troubling pattern of selective silence, particularly on policies and events that undermine the interests of marginalised communities. Their reluctance raises concerns about the future of progressive dissent in Tamil Nadu.
Meanwhile, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has actively sought to expand its influence by using religion-based mobilisation that targets Tamil sensibilities. From the Hindu Munnani’s recent focus on the popular Tamil deity Murugan to anti-Muslim agitations in Thirupuramkundram, provocatively framed as “south India’s Ayodhya”, a desperate attempt to create a Hindu vote bank has become increasingly visible.
On Dalit rights
At present, Tamil Nadu’s anti-Hindutva alliance is neither anti-neoliberal nor meaningfully anti-caste.
The DMK’s anti-caste politics often stop at opposing Brahminical dominance in cultural and institutional spaces but fall short of advancing substantive economic, political, and social power for Dalits.
This is especially visible in the context of caste-pride killings and crimes against Dalits. The recent murder of Kavin Selvaganesh in Tirunelveli has once again reignited demands for a special law to address caste-pride murders.
In 2015, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)] first introduced a private member’s bill against so-called ‘honour’ killings in the Tamil Nadu Assembly. In 2022, a people’s draft bill against ‘honour’ killings was submitted in person to Chief Minister MK Stalin.
The issue resurfaced in 2024, after the CPI(M)’s Tirunelveli unit and the Tamil Nadu Untouchability Eradication Front (TNUEF) facilitated the self-respect marriage of a Dalit man and a Forward Caste woman. The woman is from the Pillai caste, and her family was accused of ransacking the CPI(M)’s Tirunelveli office.
In response, CPI(M) raised the demand for special legislation in the Assembly, but Stalin dismissed the need for new legislation, claiming that existing laws were sufficient, likely due to fears of alienating the dominant Other Backward Class (OBC) vote banks.
The same year, TNUEF also held agitations in Chennai demanding special legislation against caste killings.
Since 2021, Tamil Nadu has reportedly witnessed over 30 incidents related to caste-pride violence. In 2024, seven ‘honour’ killings have been recorded. Despite their long-standing commitments to social justice, both the Left and VCK had stopped short of launching a broad and sustained campaign in response. Their demands for legislation remained confined to press releases and symbolic protests.
After Kavin’s murder, the Left and the VCK submitted a letter to Stalin, demanding special legislation. The VCK has also called for a state-wide agitation on August 9, reiterating this demand.
The response of the Left and VCK to other issues concerning Dalits during this government has also been tepid when compared to their past.
It was CPI(M) and the TNUEF who brought the underutilisation of Scheduled Caste Sub Plan (SCSP) and Tribal Sub Plan (TSP) funds into mainstream political debate more than a decade ago.
In 2023, TNUEF even submitted a draft bill on the matter. The National Coalition for SCP-TSP Legislation (NCSTL) also presented a draft bill, which was supported by the VCK leader Thol Thirumavalavan.
Despite these efforts, Tamil Nadu’s special law, passed in 2024, to monitor SCSP and TSP spending has proven inadequate. It fails to guarantee accountability and also legitimises the diversion of funds to unrelated schemes, activists have pointed out.
Yet neither the Left nor the VCK have openly critiqued this law or demanded a stronger one. This underscores how limited the space is for radical allies within the current alliance to push for substantive change and how they have effectively abandoned sustained pressure for meaningful reform.
During the previous DMK government (2006–2011), the same progressive forces were known for leading sustained movements until the issues were resolved. In 2008, the state government demolished the infamous caste wall in Madurai district’s Uthapuram after TNUEF, CPI(M), and other progressive organisations put up a relentless fight.
In villages such as Pappapatti, Keeripatti, Nattarmangalam, and Kottakachiyendal, where dominant caste groups prevented Dalits from even filing nominations for reserved panchayat president posts, the VCK and the Left challenged the practice. When the state administration attempted to bypass the problem by bringing these villages under a rotation system, the Left and VCK protested vigorously and ensured that elections were held democratically.
The sub-quota for Arunthathiyars, categorised as SC, was achieved through sustained political mobilisation by TNUEF, the Left parties, and other organisations.
TNUEF and the Left have additionally led multiple temple entry movements to secure Dalits’ right to worship. These campaigns were pursued despite alleged violent attacks on their cadres, including elected representatives.
In contrast, during the present regime, the Left and VCK have not undertaken such strong political mobilisations against the DMK government’s failures in addressing crimes against Dalits. Despite a surge in such crimes, the government’s response has often been inadequate or questionable.
In the Vengaivayal case, for instance, FIRs were filed against Dalit youths who belonged to the very community targeted by the crime. While both the VCK and CPI(M) have raised doubts about and disapproved of the CB-CID’s chargesheet—demanding a CBI probe—they have failed to mount a strong protest.
Meanwhile, 24 custodial deaths have occurred since the DMK came to power, but this has not sparked the kind of sustained political mobilisation that the Left and VCK led during the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam’s (AIADMK) tenure. While the alliance partners have occasionally organised local protests, there has been no coordinated state-level movement.
In the past, such incidents would have drawn strong and direct criticism of the ruling party. Though Stalin holds the police portfolio, there has been no comparable critique of the government. Human rights activist and advocate Henri Tiphagne has alleged that DMK party officials were directly involved in negotiating with the family of Ajith Kumar, the latest custodial death victim, to accept Rs 50 lakh in exchange for withdrawing or downplaying the case. Yet there has been no criticism of the DMK from either the Left or the VCK.
The Left and the VCK’s political calculus appears to prioritise unity over accountability, resulting in a reluctance to confront the government head-on even when core principles of social justice are at stake. Their responses to structural injustices have often remained limited in scope and intensity.
On labour and development
The DMK, Congress, and BJP may differ in ideological rhetoric, but their economic agendas increasingly converge. All three parties prioritise infrastructure-led growth, ease of doing business, and investor-driven development.
In 2023, the DMK government passed an amendment to the Factories Act, effectively increasing the legal workday from eight to twelve hours, despite opposition from alliance partners. This blatantly anti-labour move was withdrawn only after intense pressure from trade unions, Left parties, and the VCK. Ironically, the BJP and its former ally, the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), also staged walkouts.
The BJP has implemented similar legislation in Gujarat and attempted to do so in Uttar Pradesh until the High Court intervened. When the Congress-led Karnataka government proposed changes to the Karnataka Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, the state’s labour minister claimed the move was based on suggestions from the Union government to amend working hours.
The Samsung labour dispute in Tamil Nadu’s Sriperumbudur rose from the company’s refusal to recognise a workers’ union. While the state government sided with the company, it was the Left that fought relentlessly to defend the workers’ rights.
Yet outside these headline-making conflicts, both the Left and VCK have struggled to protect labour rights or secure meaningful gains for the working poor.
One pressing example is the unresolved issue of guest lecturers in government and government-aided colleges and universities. Despite widespread vacancies, the state government has refused to regularise these positions or pay salaries in accordance with University Grants Commission (UGC) norms. Similar challenges face non-permanent schoolteachers, as well as nurses and doctors in government hospitals, all of whom continue to work under precarious conditions.
While the DMK continues to implement welfare measures—such as cash transfers and free bus travel for women—these do little to disrupt the deeper processes of land dispossession, labour precarity, and caste-based exclusion.
Rather than alleviating hardship, development policies are often implemented without considering their impact on the working poor. The shifting of the Koyambedu bus terminal to Kilambakkam has disrupted the livelihoods of hundreds of informal vendors. Similarly, the displacement of residents near Parandur for the proposed greenfield airport has sparked widespread protests. Yet alliance partners have failed to mount a strong and sustained opposition to these policies.
It is worth recalling that the DMK once spearheaded landmark initiatives such as the creation of the Slum Clearance Board, renamed the Tamil Nadu Urban Habitat Development Board (TNUHDB) in 2021. Originally tasked with constructing tenements for the urban poor within city limits, the TNUHDB has in recent years become an instrument of forced eviction under the banner of “urban renewal”.
Across Tamil Nadu, the government has reportedly displaced at least 9,724 families over the past three years—often deploying the police to enforce evictions and bulldoze homes. It is telling that Stalin reportedly described the demolition of ‘Madrasi Camp’ in Delhi as a “humanitarian crisis”, even as similar evictions are carried out under his own administration.
While the Left has been at the forefront of resisting these evictions, it has so far dealt with them as isolated incidents.
Tamil Nadu’s history of political dissent
Tamil Nadu has long been home to a vibrant tradition of dissent. In the decades following Independence, the Congress faced fierce opposition from both the Left and the Dravidian parties, especially the DMK and its ideological parent, the Dravidar Kazhagam (DK).
After the DMK came to power in 1967, voices from the Left and DK continued to play a vital role in pushing the government on issues of caste, labour, and social justice.
Even after the DMK split and the AIADMK emerged, a competitive welfare politics took shape, driven not only by party rivalry but also by pressure from progressive forces. This dissent was not merely tolerated. It became a structuring force in shaping major policies. Initiatives like the Arunthathiyar sub-quota, welfare boards for informal workers, and the common school education system (samacheerkalvi) were not simply outcomes of internal consensus. They were won through the political struggle of the Left and progressive forces.
It is the presence of credible dissent that has ensured delivery, expansion, and accountability in welfare governance. Today, however, this legacy of productive dissent is under threat. The urgency to maintain alliance unity against Hindutva has muted the very voices that once held governments accountable.
Tactical silence comes at a cost
Yes, Hindutva remains a serious and growing threat. But the fear of Hindutva cannot justify an alliance that fails to confront caste exploitation, labour suppression, and economic dispossession. The logic of ‘staying united to defeat the BJP’ has reached a point where it effectively silences those who once gave Tamil Nadu its critical edge.
This silence is already producing political costs.
The Left and VCK, by failing to openly oppose the DMK’s governance model, may find it harder to mobilise independent credibility. Younger voters—especially those disillusioned by rising inequality and joblessness—see little difference between technocratic neoliberalism and authoritarian neoliberalism. In this environment, dissent is not just principled. It’s necessary for survival.
Reclaiming the opposition
For Tamil Nadu to remain a model of democratic resistance, its progressive forces must remain principled and independent. They must do so not only in their opposition to Hindutva but also in confronting the state’s deepening class and caste hierarchies.
The Left and VCK continue to be among the most committed voices for social justice in the state. But compared to their own past, their present stance feels increasingly compromised and muted by the pressures of alliance politics and the fear of enabling the BJP’s rise.
The DMK has succeeded in shaping a narrative that it is the only firewall between Tamil Nadu and the BJP. But firewalls can also trap dissenting voices, isolate critical allies, and smother the very ideals they claim to protect.
Tamil Nadu’s political and social progress depends not just on who is in power but on the presence of a credible, progressive opposition; an opposition that is willing to challenge injustice regardless of who governs. If these dissenting forces weaken further, it is not just their credibility at stake. The erosion of progressive dissent may create a political vacuum in which Hindutva and other regressive forces could find fertile ground.
Only by remaining true to their values can progressive parties uphold their credibility and earn the enduring confidence of the people.
Kishorekumar Suryaprakash is a researcher working on urban transformation, labour, and inequality in south India. He is currently pursuing a PhD in Economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA. Views expressed here are the authors’ own