The renewed debate on simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and state Assemblies has brought electoral reform back into national focus. A Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) is currently examining bills to implement simultaneous state and national elections in the interest of stability, efficiency, and reduced expenditure.
While these objectives might be reasonable, the current debate risks addressing the symptoms of democratic dysfunction rather than its underlying causes. The question before the nation is not merely whether elections should be held simultaneously, but whether the present electoral system is fulfilling its original constitutional purpose.
India adopted universal adult franchise at independence with extraordinary faith in the wisdom of its citizens. Elections were conceived as a mechanism through which individuals chosen by the people would represent their aspirations in governance. The ballot paper itself reflects this design: voters choose among candidates, not political parties.
Yet over the decades, the system has gradually shifted from being a contest between individuals to a de facto contest between organised political formations. This transformation has had profound consequences for accountability, representation, and the quality of leadership.
The deeper problem is not the timing of elections but the design of the political process itself. Instability in coalition governments, often cited as justification for sweeping reforms, is not inevitable.
Several parliamentary democracies maintain stability through institutional mechanisms such as the constructive vote of no confidence (CVNC), under which a government can be replaced only when an alternative majority is simultaneously ready to assume office.
Such arrangements preserve both stability and accountability without curtailing democratic choice. Instead of altering the electoral calendar, India may benefit more from examining these structural reforms. Mature, stable democracies have CNVC in their constitutions and helped stable coalition politics. The CVNC started in Germany (Article 67) in the early 1950 and has spread to Spain (Article 113), Belgium (Article 96), Hungary (Article 21), Poland (Article 158), and Slovenia (Article 116).
The emphasis on stability has further reinforced the dominance of political parties over elected representatives. Measures such as the anti-defection law, though introduced to prevent political opportunism, have had the unintended effect of restricting the independence of elected representatives. Members of legislatures are often compelled to vote along party lines even when their conscience, judgement or the interests of their constituents demand otherwise.
In the pursuit of stable governments, the anti-defection law has gradually eroded the freedom that elections were meant to secure, and has instead become an oft-exploited backdoor channel for defection rather than a deterrent.
Major democracies such as the US, UK, Italy, France, Canada, Australia, Germany, Netherlands, and Denmark do not have anti-deflection laws and instead encourage concepts like conscience voting.
It is in this context that the current proposal for simultaneous elections must be examined.
A broader reflection is also needed on the role of political parties. Parties may be indispensable to democratic life, but they were never intended to become the sole gateways to public office. Their proper role is to articulate ideas, mobilise opinion, and help bring capable individuals into public life, not to overshadow the very representatives whom the people elect. When parties become centres of power in themselves, elections risk turning into contests between organisations rather than a search for the best individuals to serve the public.
One of the clearest indicators of this shift lies in the structure of election finance. The law imposes strict limits on the expenditure of individual candidates, recognising that excessive money power disrupts the level-playing field and distorts free competition. However, there is no comparable limit on the expenditure that political parties can incur during election campaigns.
The result is a structural imbalance in which electoral success increasingly depends not on the candidate’s merit but on the financial and organisational strength of the party backing the candidate. When victory depends on the political party’s support, a candidate’s loyalty is likely to be divided between the voters and the party. Such a conflict of interest weakens the direct relationship between the people and their representatives, which is the very foundation of parliamentary democracy.
India’s electoral system has evolved through many reforms over the decades, often in response to immediate problems such as criminalisation of politics, misuse of money, or instability of governments. These reforms have been necessary, but they have also tended to focus on controlling undesirable outcomes rather than examining whether the system is structured to produce the best possible leadership. A mature democracy must periodically return to first principles and ask whether its institutions still serve their original purpose.
The present moment offers such an opportunity. Instead of limiting the discussion to whether elections should be held simultaneously, the country may benefit from a wider debate on how to strengthen the link between citizens and their representatives, ensure fairness in campaign finance, safeguard the independence of elected members, and design institutions that provide stability without sacrificing freedom.
Electoral reform should not aim merely at administrative convenience; it should aim at renewing the spirit of representative democracy itself.
Shrikant Karwa is a student of AI Ethics, working at the intersection of technology and identity.
Views expressed are the author’s own.