

The country is arguing about its umpire. As this is written, the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) is facing petitions in the Supreme Court and demands for his resignation. Fair umpiring matters, and it must be secured. But even a perfect umpire cannot fix the rules of the game. On a tilted pitch, the most honest umpire in the world will only preside fairly over an unfair match.
I belong to the generation that let the pitch tilt. We complained at dinner tables and voted for the same symbols. The people we elected grew richer, their criminal cases grew heavier, and we learned to call it normal.
The young have stopped calling it normal. When some of them were dismissed as cockroaches, they turned the insult into a movement that reached millions within days, on almost no money. I am proud of them.
Only the young, it seems, still have the courage and the energy to ask uncomfortable questions of those in power. So I have written down the questions I believe go to the root, as a letter I hope they will make their own: to their elders, to those in power, and to our courts. The questions are theirs to ask. The answers belong to all of us.
Here’s the letter:
QUESTIONING OUR ELECTIONS FROM FIRST PRINCIPLES
1. Increasing criminality in electoral politics
Why do so many of our elected representatives face serious criminal charges? These are not minor cases. The Association for Democratic Reforms counts a case as serious if the offence carries a maximum sentence of five years or more, is non-bailable, or involves charges such as murder, kidnapping, crimes against women, or corruption. In 2024, 31% of elected MPs, nearly one in three, declared serious criminal cases against themselves, up from 14% in 2009. Why is this number rising?
If an election is meant to choose the best among us, its filtering function clearly seems a bit broken. Why is it failing to reduce the number of candidates with serious criminal cases? Only when the legal system convicts an elected representative does the system take the face-saving step of removing them.
The argument here is not about when to disqualify candidates with criminal cases – at the stage of charges or only after conviction. The deeper question is this: if elections are a process through which people exercise their will, and that process is increasingly unable to filter out candidates with serious criminality concerns, can it still be trusted to select the best people to lead us? Or is the mediocrity of electoral outcomes the new normal?
This trend also suggests that voters are, in some sense, becoming increasingly blinded during elections, with candidates' credentials becoming irrelevant, assuming criminality is not itself the dominant preference of voters. Is this not a concern that warrants reflection and correction?
2. Fairness and uncapped political party spending
Our election law recognises that money influences who wins. So, to give candidates of modest means a fair chance, it caps what a candidate may spend: up to Rs 95 lakh in the larger states. Yet the same law permits a political party to spend unlimited amounts indirectly in support of its candidate in the same election. How is this a fair fight? An independent candidate fights with one capped purse; a party candidate fights with the same purse, plus a machine with no spending limit.
This anomaly was recognised by the Supreme Court in October 1974, when it held that a candidate could not evade the spending ceiling by allowing their party to spend on their behalf. Since the court's observation threatened the relevance of political parties in elections, and the electoral prospects of their candidates, politicians of the time amended the law to treat party spending separately from candidate spending.
Looking at this episode, perhaps it is time to ask whether this amendment is fair to democracy. Does it benefit ordinary people, or does it primarily allow political parties to become the new centres of supreme power?
The absence of a spending ceiling for political parties during elections tilts the pitch and gives party candidates a significantly higher probability of winning than independents. This disparity is reflected in the 2024 Lok Sabha election results, in which only seven of the 3,915 independent candidates won, compared with 536 of the 4,445 candidates fielded by political parties. Independents had roughly a one-in-500 chance of winning, while party candidates had a one-in-eight chance. Even allowing for the fact that many independents may not be serious contenders, a gap of seventy to one cannot be explained by seriousness alone. The same disadvantage applies to candidates fielded by opposition parties with fewer financial resources. So, is this disparity natural, fair, and in the interests of democracy, ordinary people, and good governance?
Now consider a word we use without thinking: independent candidates. Independent of whom? Not of us, the voters, but of a political party. By our own vocabulary, a party candidate is therefore dependent – on the party. It is natural, then, for party candidates to have divided loyalties: between the people they are supposed to represent and the political party whose ticket helped them win. When a party ticket significantly increases the probability of victory, as the figures above suggest, it is not difficult to guess which loyalty comes first for party candidates.
In the current electoral set-up, the probability of winning hinges significantly on a party's brand and its unlimited spending power, rather than on a detailed assessment of the incumbent's record or the challenger's capabilities. It should therefore come as no surprise that the current electoral process does little to reduce criminality or create significant incentives for public service to voters.
Thus, as a nation, we find ourselves in a situation where, nearly 80 years after independence, we are still unable to deliver basic public services. Exams without leaked papers, results that arrive on time, public jobs filled fairly, schools that teach, and clinics that heal: none of this is rocket science. These are matters of basic administration. They have been addressed in some places, but remain largely unresolved across much of India.
These problems will remain unsolved because the electoral system neither demands nor incentivises their resolution as a condition for winning elections. If we change the incentives and redesign elections so that candidates cannot hide behind the glare of political parties, the results will naturally be different, and basic, solvable problems will be addressed.
Gandhi voiced his concern about unhealthy competition among political parties and its implications for the democratic interests of the nation in his Last Will and Testament, dated 29 January 1948. He remarked that the Congress party was "a propaganda vehicle” and “had outlived its use” after India gained independence, and proposed reorganising the Congress away from politics and towards public service.
His foresight is worth pausing to consider. An organisation devoted to serving the people cannot also compete for power without being changed by the contest. He called that competition unhealthy. His advice was not taken. The Congress remained a party of power, others organised to contest it, and the competition for power, rather than service, became the organising principle of our public life.
Eight decades on, with the basic tasks of governance still unfinished, it is fair to ask whether he saw something we missed. We could take his reasoning one step further: if the contest for power changes those who set out to serve, our elections should reward the candidate who serves, while the party should step back from the foreground. Perhaps it is time to revisit the Mahatma's last will and testament, applying first-principles thinking to the realities of the modern world.
3. Democracy and elections
Humanity has paid dearly to move from monarchy to democracy. Under monarchy, power was passed between families or groups, by birth or force. Democracy replaced this with a simple idea: one person votes another to represent them. Whoever wins the most votes represents a place and its people in the larger discussions of governance, for a fixed term. An election is the process that administers that choice fairly.
The vote allows each of us to choose a person, while periodic elections allow us to replace that person if they fail us or if we believe someone else would provide better leadership. The mandate of democracy and the purpose of elections are to select individuals, not to make voters choose groups. Choosing groups moves us back towards something resembling monarchy, in which the heads of groups become the new kings and queens.
The consequences of groupism: Religion and caste are groups that have historically influenced how people vote. Society pushed these considerations into the background, and the law followed: seeking votes on the grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or language is a corrupt electoral practice. People still belong to these groups; in the interests of democracy, however, the law does not allow anyone to seek votes by invoking them.
Groups in society have been a shape-shifting phenomenon, and political parties are a current manifestation of groupism, under whose banner votes are sought. With their virtually unlimited electoral spending budgets and organisational machinery, parties can inadvertently end up obscuring the true credentials of their candidates.
This raises a more fundamental question: if the law restricts candidates from seeking votes on the grounds of religion or caste, should it also prevent party affiliation from overshadowing the individual candidate? The point is not that political parties and religious or caste identities are equivalent. Rather, it is that the voter's direct assessment of a candidate and their credentials must remain central to a fair election and a thriving democracy. When a party's glare blocks that view, it may also help explain why our elections keep returning candidates facing serious criminal charges.
It is also worth remembering that the original Constitution did not mention the words “political party”. The words entered the constitutional framework through an amendment in 1985, when the anti-defection law was introduced to bind elected representatives more closely to their parties. The law, whose anti-democratic implications have been questioned, formalises the supremacy of a candidate's loyalty to their political party, making their loyalty to citizens a secondary priority.
Anything that stands between the candidate and the people becomes a power broker, and the candidate is then torn between serving the broker and serving the people. Vigilance must therefore be permanent, accompanied by practical steps and laws that continually reduce the influence of such brokers. Today, the broker is the political party; tomorrow, it could be foreign-owned social media platforms or something else.
This brings us to the hardest and most outrageous-sounding questions. Can elections work without political parties in the foreground? If parties stepped back, what essential functions do they perform that society would have to fulfil in some other way? What was the purpose of political parties in the past, and what is their real relevance today? In an age of cheap mass communication, could pressure groups such as trade unions, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), or the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) take over some of those roles? Can a stable government be formed without parties having a direct and prominent presence in elections? And what did the anti-defection law solve, what new problems did it create, and, if it were repealed, how else could we secure the stability it sought to achieve?
‘Where are the good people?’: Each of us knows someone who should be representing us: a teacher who stays late, a doctor who answers the phone at night, an honest officer, or the neighbour everyone calls in a crisis. Why do we so rarely find their names on a ballot?
Before the 2024 election, even the Union Finance Minister said she did not have the kind of money needed to contest a Lok Sabha seat. She sits in Parliament through the Rajya Sabha, having been elected by state legislators. If the Finance Minister cannot afford to stand before voters, who can? And is this a healthy democracy?
Service to people or capital?: An elected representative's role is to serve the people. Are those we elect still serving us, or have elections turned them into servants of the capital that helped them win their seats?
Candidates do need some money to make themselves known to voters. That is why the law allows election spending, and why it caps that spending, as we have seen. Here, we set aside the illegal money spent on buying votes through cash, gifts, or liquor.
Under the current electoral system, election expenses are financed exclusively through private money, with no direct financial support from the state to candidates. This model of private funding was conceived when India became a republic, at a time when direct public funding of candidates was considered unsuitable. In an electoral system entirely dependent on private capital, candidates with greater personal wealth, or access to capital through financially powerful supporters, are better placed to compete.
The complete vacuum of public funding for candidates seeking to participate in elections creates a natural dependence on, and susceptibility to the influence of, private capital. Elections, which are the gateway to public office, are thus designed to be dependent on private money. Is this in the interests of a corruption-free democracy?
One of the roles of political parties is to mobilise private capital to support their candidates. However, 95% of the winning candidates from the BJP and the Congress in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections were crorepatis. If the grapevine is to be believed, many political party candidates also pay substantial amounts to secure party tickets. Finally, political parties receive significant funding through donations from business corporations.
When public money is absent by design and private money fills the gap, we must pause. What motivates the sustained flow of private capital into election campaigns? Are these contributions genuinely charitable donations, free of any expectation of a return? Is it fair for private capital to influence politics in pursuit of selective gains?
This flow of capital into elections tilts a process that is meant to serve the public towards serving private capital. It creates incentives and pathways for elections to become a conduit through which the economically powerful invest in political influence, and potentially secure greater economic returns.
SYSTEMATIC ELECTORAL REFORMS
Every human-built process wears down over time and needs critical reflection and maintenance. Each generation must examine whether the process still does what it was designed to do, and correct it where it has drifted.
Everything above suggests that our elections need a fundamental and honest evaluation, followed by bold, systematic reform, if India's democracy is to endure and the country is to become developed, strong, fair, and equitable.
The reforms that follow are the most critical and the most difficult. They are difficult not so much because of the challenge of implementing them, but because they test the intentions of those in power. Are they ready to rise to the occasion and become statespeople – a kind of leader who has almost disappeared from our public life – and be remembered for building a strong nation? Or are they content to keep winning on a tilted pitch?
Until these reforms align the incentives of elected representatives with the interests of the people and good governance, other reforms – of the judiciary, the police, the right to recall, NOTA, and the size of constituencies and Parliament – cannot even be meaningfully considered.
1. Public money to replace or balance private capital
Elections to public office funded entirely by private money represent one of the deepest misalignments of incentives in governance. Even genuinely charitable money is still private. It may not seek an economic return, but does it not seek its share of political influence? The state may once have been unable to bear the costs of elections. Is that still true? And what hidden price does the country pay when private money tilts elections in its favour?
Across the world, public funding of politics is becoming the norm. International IDEA's survey of 181 countries finds that 125 provide public funding, including France, Germany, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Kenya, Chile, and Bhutan. India is among the minority without such funding, alongside Italy, Switzerland, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Forty-seven countries go further and ban corporate donations, including Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Greece, South Korea, and Mexico. It is time for the world's largest democracy to bring public money into elections and prevent private and corporate capital from tilting the pitch.
In the 2024 Lok Sabha election, 1,412 candidates won at least 5% of the vote in their constituency, an average of about 2.6 per seat. Taking 5% as a pragmatic test of a serious candidacy, and the Election Commission's spending limit of Rs 95 lakh as a reference point, consider this proposal: the state could reimburse actual election expenses of up to Rs 75 lakh for every candidate who clears the 5% threshold, subject to a maximum of four candidates in each constituency.
The public capital budget required would be Rs 1,630 crore (543 seats × four candidates × Rs 75 lakh). Based on the actual results of 2024, the public expenditure would have been about Rs 1,050 crore. The Union government spends roughly Rs 2,000 crore every three and a half hours. Once every five years, the state could spend the equivalent of those hours to ensure that every serious candidate has an equal opportunity to stand before voters.
Financing public funding is the smaller problem. An election-year cess or a dedicated, institutionally insulated fund could pay for it. The harder question is one of political will: does the nation want to reduce the influence of private capital on elections, so that the incentives of those who win public office are aligned with good governance?
Elections are a contest of both credentials and capital. Introducing public funding into the present system, in which parties can raise and spend private money without limit, would achieve little and could fairly be called a waste of public money. The effectiveness of public funding depends on its weight relative to private money. Direct public funding must therefore be accompanied by an equally serious effort to reduce private funding. Only then will the taxpayer's contribution to genuine candidates carry its due weight.
Once the state funds candidates, an honest question follows: what purpose does private capital serve in elections, particularly large institutional donations? Cheap, direct, mass communication means candidates need far less money to reach voters than they once did. Winning candidates in 2024 spent roughly 60% of the permitted limit. There is, therefore, less and less legitimate reason to depend on large private donations.
Spending limits can be brought down to reflect the actual cost of legitimate voter outreach. A lower limit matters less for the money it saves than for the dependence on private capital it removes. Less private money also means fewer avenues for illegal foreign capital to enter the electoral process, since such money would primarily flow through private channels.
Direct public funding, lower spending limits, and tighter restrictions on private funding are therefore parts of a single reform, not three separate measures. Together, they let the taxpayer, rather than the donor, decide who can afford to stand before the voter.
2. One Nation, One Election, with a twist
The government proposes One Nation, One Election (ONOE) in the interests of administrative efficiency. Its own legislation, the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill, 2024, acknowledges an obvious weakness: if a government falls mid-term, a fresh election would be held for the remainder of the term, potentially breaking the single electoral cycle.
ONOE can work, but only if a government can change without triggering an election. That requires two reforms: a constructive vote of no confidence and elected representatives who are free to respond to their voters rather than being bound by a party whip.
Stability by design: Elections are designed to choose individual representatives, one for each constituency. Whether those representatives form one bloc or several, the country still needs a stable government. Stability is a matter of rules, not of who wins.
In India, a no-confidence motion can bring down a government without requiring anyone to agree on what should replace it. This is one reason we have come to rely on party discipline to hold governments together.
Germany has followed a better rule since 1949, as have Spain, Belgium, Poland, and Hungary: the constructive vote of no confidence (CVNC). A head of government can be removed only if a successor is elected in the same vote. Leaders may change, but the government never lapses. Stability is built into the rule itself, so it no longer has to be secured by controlling every member's vote.
That is what could make One Nation, One Election workable: governments could change mid-term while elections remain fixed to a five-year cycle.
Free representatives: A constructive vote means something only if representatives can cast their votes freely. The anti-defection law of 1985 prevents this. Voting against a party whip can be grounds for disqualification, even when a bill harms the representative's own constituency.
Repealing the law would return representatives to the people who elected them. Voting according to one's conscience is not as unworkable as it is made out to be. When MPs and MLAs elect the President, and MPs elect the Vice-President, no party whip is binding. If our representatives can be trusted to choose the head of state according to their conscience, they can also be trusted to change a government.
Fear of horse-trading: The usual fear is that representatives who are free to vote will be bought. “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram” entered our political vocabulary in 1967, when Haryana MLA Gaya Lal switched sides several times within a fortnight. But defection paid only because a handful of switches could bring down a government.
Under a constructive vote of no confidence, they cannot: no government falls unless a majority agrees on a successor. A bought vote would therefore have little value. The representative's only lasting source of power would become the constituency that elected them.
Moreover, party control has not delivered the stability it promises. Entire parties are now split and traded. An individual who betrays voters can be removed at the next election; an organisation that does the same is far harder to hold to account.
Sunlight as the safeguard: The real check is visibility. In the 17th Lok Sabha (2019–24), fewer than one in ten bills was passed by a recorded vote. This means that, for most laws, citizens cannot find out how their own MP voted. Recording every vote on every bill and budget, and publishing it, is straightforward with today's technology. As US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote, sunlight is the best disinfectant. A representative whose every vote is public has every reason to remain accountable to their constituency.
Each of these changes requires a constitutional amendment, just as One Nation, One Election itself does. If Parliament is willing to amend the Constitution to synchronise elections, it should also be willing to make the result worth synchronising: stable governments and representatives who answer to voters.
HOW DO WE GET THERE?
This is the hardest part, even to imagine. Since independence, a web of rules, money, and institutions has grown up that favours political parties and political families over a representative's freedom to serve their constituency. Untangling it is a mammoth task.
Yet look again at what we have asked for: one spending limit for everyone, public money for serious candidates and less private money, freedom from the whip, a constructive vote of no confidence, and a recorded vote on every bill. Each measure moves the candidate forward and the party back, just as the law once moved religion and caste back from the ballot. People will still belong to parties, just as they belong to faiths. But the vote, and the representative's loyalty, would belong to the constituency.
None of this is a search for a perfect system. It is an improvement we can justify today, and one we must continue to correct, generation after generation. Yet it matters more than any single policy. When we wonder whether our country's basic problems will be solved in our lifetime, the answer lies in politics: in who holds power, and in what rewards them.
Electoral reform that is true to the purpose of democracy is the master key to many of the locks that prevent India from giving its people a good life and taking its rightful place in the world.
Change on this scale requires what the freedom struggle needed: a new mindset, courage, sustained effort, and patience. Only those at the very top of political formations stand to lose, because a free representative checks their authority. Almost everyone else stands to gain, and so we ask each of them to join us.
So we return, in closing, to those to whom we wrote.
To those who hold political power: Many of you are not rich. Many of you entered public life to serve and found yourselves waiting on the pleasure of a party. Even those among you who are well established risk fortunes to win, only to find themselves answerable to the donors who financed their campaigns. Is this game good for you? Help change it.
To those who hold power in the civil service: You see every day where good policy dies between the file and the field. Within the bounds of your service, help design a fairer process.
To those who hold power in business: We have written plainly about private money in elections, but we do not suggest that every donor seeks a favour. No company can stop donating on its own for fear that a rival will not. Only a rule that binds everyone allows everyone to stop. Direct public funding, accompanied by firm restrictions on corporate money, would allow businesses to compete on price, quality, and ideas rather than proximity to power.
The firms that stand to lose are those that benefit from access; the many that win on merit stand to gain. We urge you to disclose every political contribution you make and to say openly, through your chambers and associations, that you would welcome a rule allowing businesses to stop donating.
To our courts, with respect: In 2024, the Supreme Court held that voters have a right to know who funds political parties, because without that knowledge they cannot exercise their vote effectively. We ask the courts to carry that reasoning one step further and consider whether a vote can be truly free when one kind of candidate has access to unlimited money and another does not.
To our elders: You told us to study, work hard, and be honest. We ask only that the most important contest in our country reward those same qualities.
For our part, we can begin where we stand: by asking every candidate who they are before asking which party they belong to, by giving a sincere independent candidate a fair hearing, and by carrying these questions from our phones into our homes, our campuses, and our public life.
We do not want only a fair umpire. We want a fair game. When people can truly see a candidate – their record, their abilities, and their character – and choose freely, the judgement of the many is wiser than the power of the few. That is what elections were for. Let us make them that again.
With compassion, and in hope,
The ones who keep asking questions.
Shrikant Karwa is a student of AI Ethics, working at the intersection of technology and identity. Views expressed are the author’s own.
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