The Karnataka High Court on Tuesday, September 19, noted that the Union Government should consider imposing an age limit for the use of social media platforms. The suggestion was made while hearing an appeal filed by X Corp. (formerly Twitter) against the Union government's blocking orders, which was being heard by a division bench comprising Justice G Narendar and Justice Vijaykumar A Patil.
Justice Narendar spoke about the need for an age restriction, drawing a parallel to online gaming registration requirements, where individuals without necessary identification documents like Aadhar are prohibited from joining. He remarked, "Today, school-going children are so addicted to it. I think there should be an age limit, such as in the Excise rules."
According to Bar and Bench, Justice Narendar expressed concerns about the maturity levels of young users in discerning content that is in the best interest of the nation, not only on social media but also on the internet at large. He added, "Children maybe 17 or 18, but do they have the maturity to judge what is or is not in the interest of the nation? Not only on social media, even on the internet, things should be removed, it corrupts the mind. User of social media should be at least the age of 21"
The High Court's remarks were made in the context of X Corp.'s challenge to the Union government's blocking orders issued by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act. The court had previously imposed a cost of Rs 50 lakhs on the company and required a deposit of 50% of the cost as a demonstration of good faith.
X Corp. argued in its appeal that the imposition of such high costs is unjust and inhibits them, as well as other intermediaries, from contesting blocking orders that contravene Section 69A or the Blocking Rules. The company contended that upholding the single bench decision would embolden the Union Government to issue more blocking orders that violate statutory provisions.
Additionally, the company asserted that the impugned order failed to adhere to the explicit requirement of Section 69A(1) for reasons to be recorded in writing in a blocking order. It argued that the interpretation of Section 69A(1) in the impugned order leads to redundancy, which is legally impermissible.
The division bench has reserved orders on the company's application seeking interim relief.
