On August 1, we woke up to the news of the US killing long time jihadist and Al-Qaeda (AQ) head Ayman al-Zawahiri. He was killed in Kabul, which the American and allied forces left unceremoniously last year handing over to Taliban whom they fought for two decades. Given AQ’s long-standing ties with the Taliban, and most importantly with the Haqqani Network, intelligence agencies feared a Taliban ruled Afghanistan would become a fertile ground for AQ and other global jihadist organisations. The first regime of the Taliban sheltered Laden and the senior leadership of AQ, with the 9/11 attacks planned from Afghan soil.
Seeking international legitimacy, the Taliban this time positioned themselves as freedom fighters of Afghanistan and denied harbouring global jihadist forces in their territory. But the killing of al-Zawahiri in the heart of Kabul, which once housed foreign diplomats, points to a continued support and patronage of Taliban to the Salafist group.
The AQ that al-Zawahiri left behind is weaker and a shadow of its former self, with reduced organisational and operational capabilities. The legacy of al-Zawahiri, an ophthalmologist turned global jihadist, is often disputed. Some experts say that he is the actual mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks with Laden being the face of the organisation.
As a leader of AQ for over a decade, while he could not bring back the lost capabilities he was successful in keeping the terror brand alive amidst the rise of Islamic State (IS), which took over territories that saw fighters flocking Syria and Iraq from across the world.
AQ affiliates are now spread from the Atlantic coast in northern Africa to South Asia. The extent of loyalty these affiliates profess to the central leadership is however not clear. The death of al-Zawahiri signals the end of a generation at AQ – a generation that founded the organisation as a centralised group and oversaw a shift to an independent franchise model.
The leadership transition not only poses an existential threat to the authority of AQ in global jihadist circles but also helps IS consolidate its position. Ever since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi rejected AQ’s authority and broke away declaring a caliphate, the two are fighting a leadership battle for the global jihadist movement. As IS lost swathes of territory after the onslaught of American and allied forces, AQ – and more importantly al-Zawahiri – could regain some lost stature as a dedicated jihadist fighter.
Locally in Afghanistan, in the last one year, IS-Khorasan, the most notorious IS affiliate currently, ran a propaganda that the Taliban are not true jihadists highlighting its cosying up with Americans and infidels. IS-K has been successful in attracting disgruntled Taliban fighters and boosting their ranks.
The death of al-Zawahiri while under the protection of Taliban provides an opportunity for IS-K to intensify its propaganda war against the Taliban and attract Taliban and AQ fighters to consolidate itself as a lone challenger of the Taliban. As IS-K grows, radicalisation and sectarianism is bound to spill over to central Asian and South Asian countries. IS-K is already said to have gained a foothold in the rugged tribal regions of Pakistan.
Several reports indicate that Saif al-Adel, a former Egyptian colonel who is presently living in Iran under the careful watch of the regime, will be the next leader of AQ. Other names in contention include Yezid Mebarek, Ahmed Diriye, Abd al Rahman al Maghrebi, and others.
Whoever takes over the reins of AQ will shoulder the enormous task of sustaining the allegiance of affiliates across the world. AQ central is currently a small group of fighters based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and having loyal affiliates is crucial to the AQ brand of global terror and to keeping its rival IS in check. The battle for ideology between the two jihadist organisations is expected to continue in the near future.
Views expressed are the author’s own.
Kumar Panda is a corporate and commercial lawyer based in Hyderabad, Telangana. Apart from legal practice, he has a keen interest in studying middle-east conflicts.