The ECI also submitted that there was not even a single instance of mismatch found between data stored in the CU and the VVPAT slips in more than four crore VVPATs that were counted so far. It also argued that the VVPAT is not meant for counting and also cited privacy and secrecy concerns in handing over the slips to the voters.

The ECI said there is an unauthorised access detection module (UADM), and an alert is issued if anyone tries to access the machine unauthorisedly. The machine then gets reset to factory mode and cannot work anymore. As an additional safeguard, the unit will have to be sent back to the factory.

The court observed that there was a gap between the information furnished in the court by the ECI and the one available in the public domain. The ECI informed the court that it would be rectified by updating their FAQ section.

Advocate Maninder Singh also contended, “EVMs are standalone machines and they cannot be tampered with. VVPAT can also not be tampered with. Human error cannot be ruled out in manual counting, but it has been minimised.”

‘Need light for more than seven seconds’

Advocate Prashant Bhushan, appearing for ADR, argued that the light in the VVPAT machine remains on only for seven seconds and contended that at least the light can be on always so that voters can see the slip cutting and falling or other slip being cut and falling into the box.

The court also pulled up advocate Bhushan, saying, “Mr Bhushan, whether it is transparent, translucent glass on the VVPAT machine or bulb, you are taking it too far. The bulb helps you see it, that is all. The calculation is by the control unit every time a vote is cast, the slip falls off and the total is verified by the polling officer. Now, everything cannot be suspected. You cannot be critical of everything. If an explanation is given, you must appreciate it!.... Whether to have a bulb or not or the brightness, etc. is for them to decide. We are not disputing it is a fundamental right, but over suspicion is not working out here,” the bench observed.

Bhushan also argued that it was not possible to find out if a malicious programme is fed into the equipment and it cannot be detected as even the technician would not know about it.

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