Merit and affirmative action in India’s public employment system continue to spark heated debates in courtrooms and beyond. The real sticking point is how to interpret reservation rules when candidates from disadvantaged groups use certain relaxations.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Saurav Yadav vs State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) clarified that candidates from reserved categories who qualify on merit must be considered for general category seats, despite relaxations availed. However, this principle faces significant implementation obstacles. The fundamental issue is whether concessions, such as fee waivers or age relaxations, intended to facilitate access for reserved communities should disqualify a candidate from competing on a level playing field with general category candidates. This paradox raises fundamental questions about the nature of merit, the purpose of reservation under Article 16(4), and the constitutional promise of equality under Article 14.
This article explores the legal and ethical complexities of this issue, examining how existing rules can inadvertently create a ceiling for meritorious reserved category candidates, potentially undermining the very purpose of affirmative action.
In Union of India vs Sajib Roy (2025 SCC Online SC 1943), the Supreme Court held that candidates from reserved categories who took advantage of relaxations in age, fees, or qualifications cannot migrate to unreserved seats if the relevant recruitment rules impose restrictions.
Consider a simple case: a Dalit or OBC candidate applies for a government exam whose application fee is Rs 1,000 but pays only Rs 250 due to economic hardship, under a fee relaxation policy. Despite scoring higher than many general category candidates, the candidate is forced to occupy a reserved seat because of the fee concession. The candidate’s merit is disregarded, and their economic disadvantage is paradoxically used against them as a form of punishment.
This issue was at the centre of Union of India vs Sajib Roy. The respondent, an OBC candidate, took advantage of age relaxation to write the exam. When the result was declared, the candidate did not qualify within the OBC category, as their marks fell below the OBC cut-off. However, their marks exceeded those of the last selected candidate in the general category. On this basis, the candidate claimed eligibility for the general merit list.
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. It ruled that the recruitment was governed by the Office Memorandum (OM) dated July 1, 1998, which explicitly restricted reserved category candidates who availed age relaxation, extra attempts, or qualification relaxations from migrating to the general category. The court observed that the ability of reserved category candidates to compete in the general category depends entirely on the recruitment rules applicable in each case. Since the respondent had taken advantage of age relaxation, the 1998 OM barred their appointment in the general category.
The Tripura High Court, whose decision was overturned by the Supreme Court, had taken a different view, citing the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Jitendra Kumar Singh vs State of UP (2010) 3 SCC 119. In that case, the court held that relaxations in fees or age are merely supportive measures to make the reservation system under Article 16(4) effective. These relaxations are not part of the reservation itself but tools to enable reserved candidates to enter the competition. Once in the arena, such candidates should be free to compete on merit with general candidates. These relaxations merely enlarge the pool of candidates and do not confine them to reserved seats.
Overturning this decision on September 9, 2025, the Supreme Court cited the 1998 OM, but the OM itself raises serious concerns about its constitutionality. If the OM prevents meritorious reserved category candidates from competing for general seats simply because they took advantage of age or fee relaxations, it defeats the actual purpose of reservation.
Reservation under Article 16(4) is intended to give equal opportunity and representation to historically disadvantaged groups. Relaxations in age, fees, or other criteria are tools to facilitate access to competition, not to lower merit. By restricting the overall presence of reserved category candidates, the 1998 OM undermines the spirit of Article 16(4) and indirectly violates the principles of equality under Article 14 and non-discrimination under Article 16. It effectively penalises reserved category candidates for using facilities permitted by the Constitution.
Notably, it is important to note that the 1998 OM itself made no mention of fee relaxation. Yet, in its recent judgement, the Supreme Court extended the bar even to those who had availed fee concessions, thereby adding a new obstacle. In the case of sub-classification, the court did not even have adequate empirical data to justify its reasoning. The court and the government are steadily heading towards the de-reservation policy without having proper data and reasoning. Such decisions appear to be driven more by political considerations than by the larger public interest.
In Indra Sawhney vs Union of India (1992), the Supreme Court underscored that the purpose of reservation must enhance the representation of backward classes in the public sector. Similarly, in Jitendra Kumar Singh vs State of UP (2010), the court observed that relaxations in age or fees are facilitative measures and do not disqualify candidates from competing for general category seats on merit. The 1998 OM is directly inconsistent with these principles and effectively dilutes the fundamental principle of the substantive equality guaranteed by the Constitution. Executive instructions, such as the 1998 OM, cannot supersede constitutional guarantees and are, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution.
Looking closely at Indian society, it’s clear that people who benefit from reservations are often not just socially backward but also economically poor. Dalits, tribals, and other backward communities face the highest levels of poverty, unemployment, and hunger. Due to their financial struggles, they use exam fee concessions to apply for tests. But if using this concession is seen as taking reservation benefits and they are denied general category seats despite scoring above the cut-off for the general category, it’s deeply unfair and wrong. It’s just like reserving 50% of seats for just 15-20% of people in the open category.
The 1998 OM winds up turning tools of support into barriers, forcing meritorious candidates from disadvantaged communities into a ceiling rather than opening doors for them. If equality under Articles 14 and 16 is to be more than a promise on paper, we need to make sure there are clear laws that treat concessions as facilitators, not punishments of their marginalisation, and a judiciary willing to strike down rules that forbid fair opportunity.
True justice lies not in penalising relaxations but in recognising them as bridges of equality. Justice for marginalised communities must be defined not by the privileged people but by the lived struggles and aspirations of the oppressed themselves.
Ganesh Ashok Pandit is a practising advocate at the Bombay High Court, working on cases related to social justice.
Views expressed are the author’s own.