If you’ve followed Kerala politics over the decades, the state’s 2026 Assembly election results might not shock you.
The state has a long, almost predictable pattern, where power alternates between the LDF and UDF every five years.
Back in 2021, the Left front led by Pinarayi Vijayan broke that pattern and came back to power. And at the time, it felt like Kerala had moved beyond its strict anti-incumbency rhythm.
So from the surface, 2026 only seems to have reset that system.
Except, look closer, and you realise this isn’t just a routine correction. Because for LDF, this wasn’t a narrow loss, it was almost a collapse.
The LDF has fallen from 99 seats in 2021 to just 35. The CPI(M) itself has dropped to 26 seats, down from 62. That’s its lowest tally in years. Thirteen ministers have lost. Strongholds have flipped. And even in Dharmadam, a seat that rarely raises questions, Pinarayi Vijayan looked vulnerable for a while.
So yes, Kerala may have returned to its familiar pattern. But the scale of this verdict suggests something else is going on.
Was this just delayed anti-incumbency? Or was this about deeper problems — inside the party, in its politics, and in how it connected with people?
That’s what we’re unpacking today. Let Me Explain.
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We believe there’s much more than numbers to be discussed during elections, and over the past few months, we’ve brought you careful, nuanced stories from states that went to polls—like this episode reported and written in Lakshmi Priya.
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Let’s start with the simplest explanation, the one that everyone reaches for first – anti-incumbency.
Of course, thirteen ministers losing is not normal. When people reject not just a government, but the people running key departments — health, local governance, industries, education — that’s a strong signal.
But anti-incumbency alone doesn’t explain everything. Analysts have pointed out that what happened in Kerala wasn’t just anger, it also seemed like targeted correction.
The many victories of CPIM rebels are the biggest examples. People like V Kunhikrishnan in Payyannur, TK Govindan in Thaliparamba, and even former minister G Sudhakaran — these were all insiders. They broke away, contested against the party, and won.
And they hadn’t campaigned saying “defeat the Left.” They were saying something far more uncomfortable — that this is no longer the Left we recognise, and that it’s time for a change.
And as numbers show, voters appear to have agreed.
So what does that tell us?
That this election wasn’t just about people moving away from Left politics. It was about even supporters of the Left feeling like the party itself had moved away from what it stood for.
And that brings us to the second layer of the problem– the party’s internal democracy and leadership style.
Communist parties are built on the idea of collective leadership. Debates, disagreements, and internal corrections are supposed to be their strength.
But what we’re hearing repeatedly is that those spaces have shrunk.
Even when discussions happened, they were just cosmetic, they never really influenced outcomes. Because decisions were pre-determined.
And when that happens, people don’t just quietly accept it. They find other ways to express it.
Sometimes, that means rebellion, which is exactly what we saw.
Then there was the criticism of too much control vested with Pinarayi Vijayan.
Now let’s move to something more political — ideology.
One of the sharper criticisms that’s come up is this: has the CPI(M) blurred the line between itself and the BJP?
Definitely not in a direct sense, but in subtler ways.
There’s been talk of a “soft Hindutva” turn, whether through symbolic gestures or positioning, or attempts to appeal to majority sentiment. Events like the Ayyappa Sangamam, or the way Sabarimala-related narratives played out, fed into this perception.
And this is where the problem becomes strategic.
Because if you’re a Left party, your strength lies in offering a clear alternative. The moment that line gets blurred, you’re not just confusing voters, you’re weakening your own base.
At the same time, this didn’t even help electorally in the way it might have been intended.
Hindu votes didn’t consolidate behind the Left. In fact, in many places, they drifted toward the Congress.
And on the other side, minority voters, particularly Muslims, moved away as well. Decisions like aligning with figures such as Vellappally Natesan, who has made controversial Islamophobic remarks, created discomfort.
So you end up in a situation where your core ideological clarity weakens, your traditional base feels uneasy, and you don’t gain new voters in return.
That’s a tough place to be.
Then there’s the process of candidate selection and perception of favouritism.
This is an issue that has come up again and again.
From the rise of leaders seen as close to the top leadership, to decisions like fielding PK Shyamala in Taliparamba, the perception that positions were being controlled by a small circle became hard to ignore for many.
Even if every individual decision can be defended, the cumulative effect matters.
Because politics is as much about perception as it is about reality.
We also have to talk about something that often gets overlooked — the relationship with the media.
The CPI(M) has always had a tense relationship with the media. That’s not new.
But in recent years, that tension seems to have escalated.
There have been multiple instances of journalists facing cases, police action, or direct confrontation. At the same time, the party has argued that sections of the media are biased, corporatised, and actively hostile.
Both things can be true to an extent. But when this becomes a pattern, when criticism is seen as something to be countered rather than engaged with, it creates a larger perception problem.
Because voters are watching that too.
And it feeds into a broader image, that the government is becoming less comfortable with dissent, whether inside the party or outside it.
Now, let’s bring this back to the matter of governance.
On paper, the LDF had a strong case. The government’s infrastructure projects, welfare schemes, crisis management, etc, especially during COVID, all of this was highlighted.
But elections aren’t just about what you did. They’re about how people felt about what you did.
Let’s take Wayanad for instance.
After the landslide, the government highlighted its rehabilitation work, especially its 410-house project. But on the ground, only around 178 houses were completed, and many weren’t fully livable.
That gap, between claim and experience, also matters.
The same thing shows up in other areas, whether it concerns healthcare controversies, job opportunities, and perceptions of delayed or inadequate responses, etc.
Even if some of these are exaggerated, or politically amplified, they shape voter sentiment.
And then there’s the seemingly very surface-level concern of the ‘tone’ used.
This might sound small, but it isn’t. Because politics is not just policy, it’s also about how you speak to people.
Over time, there’s been a shift in how the leadership is perceived. It went from decisive to dismissive and from confident to combative.
Pinarayi’s statements like “kadakku purath” or “veettil poyi chodikku” become symbols of a certain kind of arrogance. Discussions of those travelled and they stuck.
And finally, the results.
The UDF didn’t just edge past the Left. It swept, winning 102 seats. The Congress improved not just its vote share, but its strike rate. The IUML consolidated its position, and minority votes, to an extent, regrouped.
The BJP, interestingly, didn’t see any vote share jump, but still managed to win three seats.
This means, Kerala still rejects communal politics but they chose an alternative force.
If you put all of this together, the picture becomes clearer. This wasn’t just anti-incumbency or ideological drift or organisational failure. It was, in fact, all of these things feeding into each other.
None of these alone may have caused this result, but together they did.
And maybe the most important takeaway is this. Voters in Kerala didn’t reject the idea of the Left. They rejected the version of it they were seeing. Which also means this isn’t the end of the story, it’s a turning point.
Whether the CPI(M) treats it as one, that’s what will decide what comes next.
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