In what came as a double whammy, the Karnataka High Court reprimanded veteran actor and filmmaker Kamal Haasan for remarking that Kannada was born out of Tamil. The reprimand came at a time when Haasan had attracted widespread ire for his remark and campaigns had been launched to boycott his new film Thug Life in Karnataka. Snippets of the hearing went viral on social media and the High Court’s adverse observations were widely reported. This episode raises several pertinent legal and normative questions, particularly about the scope and standard of protection accorded to freedom of speech and expression.
Backlash to Kamal Haasan’s controversial remark
It all began at the audio launch program of Thug Life in Karnataka on May 25. While addressing the audience and Kannada actor Shivarajkumar in particular, Haasan opined (albeit in passing) that Kannada originated from Tamil. In the next few days, Haasan came under fire from various quarters, including political leaders in Karnataka. The Minister for Kannada and Culture Shivaraj Tangadagi said that Haasan’s films would be banned in Karnataka if he did not apologise for his remark. This was followed by the burning of Haasan’s effigies by angry protesters and a demand for an apology by the Karnataka Film Chamber of Commerce (KFCC). An organization even attempted to initiate criminal proceedings against Haasan.
Writ petition seeking police protection
In this backdrop, Raaj Kamal Films International, the company which produced Thug Life filed a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court urging the court to restrain the KFCC from hindering the release of the film. More importantly, the petitioner sought a direction to the police to provide security to theatres and moviegoers so as to ensure safe and uninterrupted screening of the film.
When the petition came up for hearing on June 3, Haasan suffered a setback as the Court severely reprimanded him for remarking that Kannada was born out of Tamil. As the hearing was being live-streamed on the Court’s official YouTube channel, snippets of the hearing went viral on social media. Particularly, the court’s question “Are you a historian or a linguist?” and the observation “You have no right to hurt the sentiment of the masses” were widely reported and hyperbolic descriptions of the hearing garnered attention.
Emphasis on an apology
Early into the hearing, the Court orally observed: “What did the people of Karnataka ask? Apologise… And you have come before this court seeking police protection for a circumstance created by you. You have undermined the sentiments of the people of Karnataka”. Furthermore, when the petitioner’s counsel highlighted the citizens’ right to watch a film, the Court observed “Let them come and approach the court”.
These observations capture the essence of the hearing. Although the Court did mention that the petitioner’s plea for police protection would be considered as per law, the hearing in the morning and the afternoon revolved mainly around Haasan’s reluctance to apologize. With due respect to the Court, the repeated references to Haasan’s failure to apologize and ‘hurt sentiments’ of the masses are at odds with the degree of importance accorded to freedom of expression under the Constitutional scheme.
When the primary relief sought was police protection to ensure safety of moviegoers and theatres, the hearing ought to have been structured on the legality of the reliefs sought and whether the petitioner was entitled to be granted such reliefs, in light of the facts and law.
Instead, the spotlight was on the factual correctness of Haasan’s remark, his failure to apologize, his clarification to the public and the reply to the KFCC not having characteristics of an apology. The disapproval of Haasan’s refusal to apologize was even recorded in the Court’s order which reads as follows:
“A perusal at the aforequoted communication, has all the ingredients of a remorse, but since it is issued in demand of the 5th respondent (Film Chamber of Commerce) for an apology, it should have contained those words. The word ‘apology’ is nowhere found in the communication. This Court is of the prima facie opinion that, if a sentence of apology had been included while concluding the communication, it would have concluded/ended all controversy and the unrest or disharmony in the State of Karnataka.”
The fundamental right to exhibit a film
Among the various legal dimensions of this issue, the most pertinent ones are the filmmaker’s right to exhibit a film and the public’s right to watch a film. The Supreme Court has categorically held that the right of a filmmaker to make and exhibit a film (for commercial and non-commercial purposes) is protected under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution, which enshrines the right to freedom of speech and expression.
Like any other Constitutional freedom or right, the right to exhibit a film may be curtailed only through a procedure established by a valid legislation such as the Cinematograph Act 1952, among other laws, when there are statutorily recognized grounds to restrict the right. These grounds include incitement of violence, obscenity, defamation, etc. In fact, the State also has a positive obligation to ensure that a filmmaker’s right to exhibit a lawful film is protected from the wrath of violent mobs and non-state actors who are likely to disrupt peaceful exhibition of the film on the ground of ‘hurt sentiments’ and other extraneous factors. The Supreme Court has recognized the state’s positive obligation to provide security and maintain law and order in several cases.
In Indibily Creative Pvt Ltd v. Government of West Bengal (2019), the Court held:
“In the space reserved for the free exercise of speech and expression, the state cannot look askance when organized interests threaten the existence of freedom. The state is duty bound to ensure the prevalence of conditions in which of those freedoms can be exercised. The instruments of the state must be utilized to effectuate the exercise of freedom. When organized interests threaten the properties of theatre owners or the viewing audience with reprisals, it is the plain duty of the state to ensure that speech is not silenced by the fear of the mob.”
In 2018, the Karnataka High Court adopted a similar approach when the producers of Rajinikanth starrer Kaala sought police protection to exhibit the film in Karnataka. Certain organizations had called for measures to prevent the movie from being screened in Karnataka as Rajinikanth’s remarks on the Cauvery Dispute had offended them. The Court promptly ordered police protection and held that it was the “bounden duty” of the government and the police to “prevent any inconvenience to the movie goers and exhibition of the movie.”
Freedom of speech and fallacious opinions
Unfortunately, instead of focusing on the filmmaker’s right to exhibit the film and the audience’s right to view the film, the Court focused extensively on the factual inaccuracy of Haasan’s remark and his reluctance to apologize. However, his fallacious and perhaps condescending remark had already been deprecated in the marketplace of ideas ie, public discourse, conversations, etc.
As observed by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, discussion and even advocacy of unpopular ideas and causes are Constitutionally protected unless they involve incitement of violence. Therefore, Haasan and the producer of Thug Life do not lose Constitutional protection merely because of the fact that the remark on Kannada was fallacious.
Surely, one need not be a historian or a linguist to express views on a language as freedom of speech is not conditional on qualification and expertise. Imposition of extra-legal sanctions such as forced boycotts and threats of violence are deplorable and ought to be nipped in the bud by the judiciary.
In the age of live-streaming of court proceedings, oral observations are often clipped selectively and circulated on social media to suit certain narratives. As a result, the court’s ultimate decision and reasoned orders often pale into insignificance in public debates and the discourse is often shaped by oral observations made during the hearings.
While the Karnataka High Court or the Supreme Court may or may not eventually grant police protection, at this juncture, it is pertinent to bear in mind an eloquent observation of the Supreme Court in Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat (2025):
“The Courts are duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Sometimes, we, the Judges, may not like spoken or written words. But, still, it is our duty to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a).”
Rahul Machaiah is a lawyer from Karnataka. He holds an LLM in Law & Development from Azim Premji University.
Views expressed are the author’s own.