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On July 8, 2025, the Registrar General of India (RGI) announced that digital tools such as web portals and mobile apps would be made available for the 2027 census. India’s use of technology and self-enumeration methods, combined with a caste census, for the first time signals a significant shift in the country’s history of demographic data collection.
While the move aims to capture accurate socio-economic data, including caste details, to inform better policy making and addressing structural inequalities, it also raises some critical concerns. Issues of privacy, data protection, and the potential for state-led surveillance loom large. Moreover, India’s vulnerability to cyberattacks amplifies these risks, threatening both the integrity of the census process and the security of citizens’ data.
There is an urgent need to critically evaluate the implications of a digital caste census, with particular attention to the challenges of self-enumeration, privacy risks, and the looming threat of cyberattacks.
The promise and perils of digital census and self-enumeration
The use of digital technologies and self-enumeration could modernise India’s decennial census by streamlining data collection across a diverse population of over 1.4 billion population. The Government of India claims the shift will not only improve the efficiency of data gathering, but also enhance inclusivity by empowering citizens, even in remote households, to participate in the caste census online.
Indeed, the caste census will involve the collection of sensitive information about social identities and household details, all of which will be stored as digital datasets. However, this new approach comes with serious challenges.
First, India suffers from low digital literacy and unequal internet access. According to the National Family Health Survey (2021–22), only 57% of rural households had internet access, compared to 80% in urban areas. This digital divide poses a major risk of excluding rural and marginalised communities — including lowered caste groups — whose participation is critical to the census’ objectives.
The self-enumeration model also assumes that people can accurately report their social identities. But caste identities are complex, contested, and vary by region. Without enumerators to provide guidance, the risk of inaccurate or deliberately falsified data increases, which could ultimately undermine the credibility of the caste census.
There is also concern about data quality. Unlike traditional enumerator-led surveys, self-enumeration is an untested method in India and lacks real-time verification. As the government plans to use Aadhaar-based authentication to validate respondents’ identities, individuals without registered Aadhaar IDs — estimated at 2–3% of the population, often from marginalised groups — could be excluded. This risks perpetuating the very inequalities the caste census seeks to redress.
Privacy and data protection concerns
The digital caste census raises pressing questions about privacy, as sensitive personal data — such as caste, religion, gender, and socio-economic status — will be stored and processed online. India currently lacks a robust enforcement mechanism for its data protection framework, laid out under the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023.
The digital infrastructure for the census is expected to run on government servers, which are not immune to breaches. For instance, the 2023 data leak from the CoWIN vaccination portal revealed major vulnerabilities, exposing millions of citizens to identity theft. If similar breaches occur during the caste census, the fallout could include data manipulation, targeted phishing, discrimination, and the exploitation of vulnerable social groups.
Self-enumeration heightens these concerns. With no designated devices provided, citizens will upload personal information using their own phones and laptops, potentially over insecure networks and with outdated software. This opens up multiple entry points for cyberattacks. The absence of stringent guidelines on encryption and data protection during transmission increases the risk of profiling and the misuse of caste data in a deeply polarised society.
Surveillance and state overreach
Linking the digital census to Aadhaar also introduces the possibility of state surveillance. Aadhaar’s biometric and demographic database already enables broad tracking of citizens’ access to government services. The Election Commission of India has also linked Aadhaar to voter IDs. Now, the RGI’s move to integrate Aadhaar with caste census data could create a vast surveillance apparatus — mapping caste, religion, economic status, and place of residence.
This could be used not for social justice, but for voter profiling or even to suppress dissent, particularly in regions marked by caste-based political tensions. Instead of enabling targeted welfare for the marginalised, the digital caste census risks deepening surveillance and eroding democratic safeguards.
While the idea of digitally managing the caste census may appear innovative, it prioritises efficiency over ethics and accountability. The opaque process of sorting and sharing data with other government agencies has already drawn criticism. Past efforts — such as linking the National Population Register (NPR) with the census for citizenship verification, and Aadhaar with voter rolls — have been challenged by scholars and civil society groups, who fear the exclusion of minorities and lowered-caste communities.
The lack of an independent authority to monitor data use and resolve grievances further weakens public trust in the process.
Cyberattack risks in a digital census
India ranks second globally among targets for cyberattacks, revealing the scale of threats to its digital infrastructure. The Data Security Council of India (DSCI) reports that India detected an average of 761 cyberattack attempts per minute in 2024. According to a report by Prahar, a non-profit, more than 500 million cyberattacks occurred in the first quarter of that year alone.
These attacks often come from state-sponsored actors targeting critical infrastructure such as India’s power grid, which was compromised in 2020. A digital caste census, with its vast and sensitive datasets, would be a high-value target for hackers and hostile entities.
Cyberattacks could do more than breach data, they could manipulate it. Altered caste identities or income details could skew the census, distort policy decisions, or even influence electoral outcomes. Given the importance of caste demographics in governance, the implications of compromised data are far-reaching.
A calibrated approach to the digital caste census
If the government moves forward with a digital caste census, it must do so with caution and strong safeguards. First, the digital divide must be addressed by ensuring equitable access through mobile vans, community-level computer centres, and such. Second, the DPDP Act must be rigorously enforced, with regular security audits and compulsory encryption for census data.
Third, an independent regulatory body should be set up to oversee how census data is used. Finally, citizens must be educated about the process through awareness campaigns, demonstrations, and clear information about their rights under data protection laws.
The government’s ambition to use the caste census to address social inequality is commendable. But digital governance demands transparency, security, and accountability. Without these, the very communities meant to benefit from the census may end up harmed by it.
A transparent, secure, and inclusive approach is essential to ensure the census serves its intended purpose, without compromising citizens’ rights or national security.
Ashok Gurram is an assistant professor and MURTI Faculty Fellow at the Department of Political Science, GSHS, GITAM (deemed to be) University, Hyderabad. Email: gashok529@gmail.com
The views expressed are personal and do not reflect those of the university.