In an old All India Radio interview, late Kannada actor Shankar Nag offered a simple, almost tender request to his audience. “Yes, my dear fans, we will always be together. For that to happen, your cooperation and collaboration are essential… Whenever my films are released, please write to me… emphasise what you didn’t like about the movie rather than what you did. Please, correct me… I will be indebted to you.”
Shankar Nag was inviting constructive criticism. He was asking to be challenged. His words captured an era when cinema and audience stood in a conversational relationship, when criticism was treated not as hostility but as a necessary part of the craft. Today, Kannada cinema finds itself in a very different landscape. The conversation is migrating from welcoming feedback to getting gag orders from courts.
Three movies, all released this December and starring the Kannada film industry’s biggest stars, Shivarajkumar, Upendra, Kiccha Sudeep and Darshan, secured gag orders.
Pre-release injunctions: A new trend in Sandalwood
Three films, Devil, Mark, and 45, have secured ex parte John Doe injunctions (gag orders) from Bengaluru courts, all passed ahead of their releases. These orders, granted without hearing the other side (ex parte), restrain a broad spectrum of online content: reviews, videos, reactions, trolling, and even “challenging feedback.” A John Doe order allows a person or entity to take legal action against any unknown party or parties, basically meaning anyone doing a negative review or posting a bad reaction can be asked to take it down.
Ratings and reviews have been disabled on BookMyShow for Mark, 45 and The Devil.
The first of these orders was procured by the producers of The Devil, a movie starring actor Darshan, who is currently in jail, undergoing trial for murder. The producer filed a suit on September 26, and the very next day, a Bengaluru City Civil Court granted an ex parte John Doe injunction.
The order restrains a wide set of defendants, including TV9, Facebook, and Instagram, collectively labelled as “defendant medias,” from publishing, circulating, or sharing allegedly defamatory videos or statements about the film. What stands out is its breadth: the court directs even future links and URLs to be de-indexed or suppressed across search engines and instructs defendants to delete “defamatory/negative comments” from their own social media accounts. It also blocks the reuse or republication of the film’s photos or videos for any “defamatory or malicious purpose.”
While the court stated that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie case, it also invoked Order 39, Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), which requires courts to reconsider an ex parte injunction within one month. With this, the film’s makers effectively secured a wide-ranging pre-release shield ahead of its December 11 opening.
Just weeks later, on December 22, actor Kiccha Sudeep approached the vacation court seeking urgent orders before the release of his film Mark. The court first permitted the suit to be filed and exempted him from mandatory mediation under Section 89A, citing the urgency of interim relief. In the suit’s interim application, the producers asked for an expansive restraint, not only on defamatory or malicious content but also on trolling, personal attacks, false narratives, reaction videos, community polls, and even “challenging feedback.”
The court accepted online printouts placed before it as material that “probablise” the plaintiff’s claim and found a prima facie case. It directed defendants to delete the URLs listed in the application and disable sharing options for any defamatory posts, continuing the order until objections are filed.
Citing Rameshwari Devi vs Nirmala Devi, the court stressed the need for an undertaking to compensate defendants should the suit fail.
The third case, involving the film 45 starring Shivarajkumar, Upendra and Raj B Shetty, highlights the inconsistency in how trial courts are handling such matters. In November, a city civil court declined to grant an ex parte injunction to the film’s producer, stating that “freedom of speech and expression being the fundamental right, cannot be curtailed mechanically.” It issued notice to the defendants instead. But on December 9, the producer filed a fresh plea before another court and obtained an ex parte ad interim injunction the very next day.
This new order restrains YouTube channels, critics, publications and others from publishing or circulating any false, defamatory, derogatory, malicious, unverified, or damaging content about the film—both before and after release. The producer argued that negative online content was harming pre-theatrical and dubbing rights and instilling fear among business partners, affecting the livelihoods of “around 3,500 people” involved in the film. Finding a prima facie case, the court granted the injunction and scheduled the next hearing on February 4, 2026.
Speaking to TNM, advocate Rahul Machiah pointed out that the order does not satisfy the Supreme Court’s stricter threshold in Bloomberg vs Zee, which held that ex parte injunctions against publication must only be granted in exceptional cases.
“In essence, the grant of a pre-trial injunction against the publication of an article may have severe ramifications on the right to freedom of speech of the author and the public’s right to know. An injunction, particularly ex parte, should not be granted without establishing that the content sought to be restricted is ‘malicious’ or ‘palpably false’.
Granting interim injunctions, before the trial commences, in a cavalier manner results in the stifling of public debate. In other words, courts should not grant ex parte injunctions except in exceptional cases where the defence advanced by the respondent would undoubtedly fail at trial. In all other cases, injunctions against the publication of material should be granted only after a full-fledged trial is conducted or in exceptional cases, after the respondent is given a chance to make their submissions,” the Supreme Court noted.
“It's an illegal order, as the court has to decide the application for a temporary/interim injunction within 30 days if ex parte relief (ad interim injunction) has been granted. Here, the ex parte relief was granted on December 10 and the next date is in February 2026,” he said.
What the law says
Order 39 Rule 3A mandates that courts must attempt to decide ex parte injunction applications within 30 days and record reasons if they cannot. In A Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs S Chellappan, the Supreme Court emphasised that bypassing this safeguard is permissible only in “very exceptional” situations. If courts fail to comply, appellate courts may recommend adverse entries in the judicial officer’s annual confidential report (ACR).
The Supreme Court refined the standard further in Bloomberg vs Zee Entertainment. It held that pre-trial publication injunctions can severely affect free speech and should be granted only if the material is “malicious” or “palpably false.” A prima facie case is not enough, and except in exceptional circumstances, publication should not be restrained without hearing the other side.
These concerns were also echoed by the Karnataka High Court in Kudla Rampage vs Harshendra Kumar D, which cautioned that John Doe orders must be used sparingly because they extend to unknown persons and risk sweeping in lawful speech. The High Court criticised a similar trial court order for being issued “for the asking,” without defining what statements were considered defamatory or giving reasons for such a wide restraint.
What counts as defamation and what doesn’t
In Ram Jethmalani vs Subramaniam Swamy, the Delhi High Court said that defamation involves a public communication intended to injure the reputation of another. However, not every unflattering, annoying, embarrassing or hurtful statement is actionable. The law recognises three established defences: truth, fair comment and privilege. Truth, or justification, is a complete defence, though the standard of proof is not absolute; it requires showing that the statement was ‘substantially correct’.
Fair comment protects the expression of opinions, and the court’s role is not to agree with the opinion but to determine whether it could honestly have been held by a fair-minded person on the facts known at the time. Unlike the defence of truth, fair comment can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defamer acted with malice.
Advocate Rahul Machiah identifies three systemic problems in the way pre-release injunctions are currently being granted in Kannada cinema. First, the orders are vague. “The most problematic part is the use of the expression "defamatory content" without specifying what constitutes defamatory content. This is a clear breach of the principle against granting vague injunctions, as it stifles free speech, and the defendants (including John Doe) could run the risk of being hauled up for contempt without knowing what the court order actually means.”
Second, trial courts are ignoring the Supreme Court and High Court directions by routinely granting ex parte injunctions without demonstrating that the defendants’ defence is bound to fail. Third, courts are ignoring the mandate of Order 39 Rule 3A by adjourning cases for more than 30 days after granting ex parte relief, effectively turning temporary injunctions into near-final orders without hearing the defendants.
Rahul notes that most film reviews would still fall within the fair comment exception, even if scathing or injurious. “Malice would come into the picture if the review distorts the story to mislead the viewers/readers, or if there's an effort to create fake accounts and generate large-scale false reviews. “Creating false accounts/orchestrating large-scale false reviews would also fall within the actionable civil wrong called Tortious Interference,” he said.
A Kannada producer-filmmaker, speaking to TNM, offered insight into the reasoning behind these pre-release injunctions while also critiquing their logic. He noted that social media today is unregulated and highly amplified, creating a culture where trolling and negative content can spread quickly, often monetised by those seeking engagement. This environment, he explained, has made some producers seek legal safeguards to protect their films from pre-release criticism, especially when comments cross the line into personal attacks or targeted harassment.
At the same time, he stressed the distinction between legitimate criticism and malicious content. “Freedom of expression should never be controlled by anybody,” he said, observing that genuine reviews, even if harsh, are a vital part of a film’s ecosystem. Word-of-mouth, whether positive or negative, is the lifeblood of cinema, and attempts to suppress audience feedback can be counterproductive, drawing more attention to perceived negatives, an effect famously illustrated by the Streisand effect.
The producer stressed the democratic nature of filmmaking—that the audience ultimately decides a film’s success. Anticipatory injunctions, he argued, risk isolating a film from its viewers and undermining the natural process of reception and critique.
Similar concerns about social media reviews and their impact on films have reached courts in other states, with varying outcomes.
In Kerala, an amicus curiae appointed by the High Court recently recommended regulation of social media influencers reviewing films, including a 48-hour embargo on reviews after a release. The report aimed to differentiate professional critics from online influencers, encouraged respectful and constructive criticism and suggested measures against “review bombing” via fake profiles, paid negative reviews, and bot-driven ratings. While the report sought to protect filmmakers from malicious online campaigns, the Kerala High Court has not yet ruled on the proposals.
Meanwhile, in Tamil Nadu, the Madras High Court rejected a plea by the Tamil Film Active Producers Association seeking a three-day ban on online reviews. Justice Anand Venkatesh observed that preventing early reviews would curb the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. The court noted that, in the age of social media, it is impossible to stop a person from posting a review, and producers cannot expect only positive commentary. While acknowledging concerns over “review bombing” and abusive YouTube content, the court held that such challenges could not justify a blanket restriction on criticism.